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ABSTRACT
An Economic Analysis of Food Stamp Participation in West Virginia
Ahadu T. Tekle
Poverty and food insecurity are challenging socio-economic problems that policy makers
are trying to address for a long time. Among other things, providing financial and in-kind
assistance are some of the initiatives taken to improve food security for low income
households. Food Stamp Program is an important assistance program that serves to meet
this goal. The objective of this study is to examine the implication of economic and
policy variables on food stamp participation in West Virginia. To understand the current
and lagged impact of economic variables on current food stamp participation, static and
dynamic econometric models are used. These models are estimated using panel data of
West Virginia counties. Results indicate that county poverty, unemployment, and the cost
of living directly affect the level of county food stamp participation; while employment
growth and PRWORA welfare policy tend to reduce county level food stamp program
participation.
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CHAPTER 1

1.1 INTRODUCTION
Despite the fact that the United States is one of the wealthiest nations, poverty-related
malnutrition has been a long-standing social and economic challenge for researchers and
policy makers. The number of people living in poverty has been increasing for the past
years in the United Sates. According to U.S. Census Bureau report of 2005, the
percentage of people live in poverty was 12.1, 12.5 and 12.7 percent in year 2002, 2003
and 2004, respectively.
Meeting nutritional needs is particularly difficult for poor families. In 2004, 11.9
percent of all U.S. households were "food insecure" because of lack of resources. Of the
13.5 million households that were food insecure, 4.4 million suffered from food
insecurity that was so severe that they were classified as "hungry" (Nord et al., 2005).
Food insecure households were uncertain of having or unable to acquire a supply of food
sufficient to meet basic needs at all times because of inadequate resources (Winicki et al.
,2002). Since 1999, food insecurity has increased by 3 million households. In 2004, 38.2
million people lived in households experiencing food insecurity, compared to 33.6
million in 2001 and 31 million in 1999.
The high costs of housing, health care, and medical care coupled with low
earnings create pressure on families who live on limited incomes. Among the household
expenditures, the budget allocated to food is relatively more flexible than other expenses
such as housing and medical expenses; thus, most likely food is often the first expense to
be cut.
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Since the mid-1940s, the U.S. Government has been committed to ensuring that
its citizens neither go hungry nor suffer the consequences of inadequate dietary intake.
For the past decades policy makers attempted to address the problem of low income
households by introducing numerous assistance programs to improve the lives of lowincome households. The Food Assistance Program, Aid to Families with Dependent
Children (AFDC), Supplemental Security Income (SSI), and Medicaid Program, are
some of the assistance programs introduced to assist low income families. These
programs have been a security for low-income households by providing financial and in
kind assistance.
Currently there are fifteen food assistance programs administered by USDA
aimed at improving the nutrition of low-income households. In the year 2004, the total
expenditure of USDA for food assistance programs totaled $46 billion, of which the
Food Stamp Program (FSP), the National School Lunch Program, the Special
Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infant and Children (WIC), the School
Breakfast Program, and Child and Adult Care Program, were accounted for 94 percent of
the total expenditure. During this time, the total federal funding for the FSP was $27
billion, which was 59 percent of all domestic nutrition assistance funding. In 2005, more
that 25 million Americans were receiving monthly food stamp (FS) benefits, a 40 percent
increase since the start of 2000 (The Food Assistance Landscape, 2005).
The FSP played a significant role in improving the well-being of a significant
number of children who live in low-income households. According to the USDA reports
for the past years, children (below age of 18) accounted for more than half of food stamp
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benefits. For examples, in 2000, 8.8 million children received food stamp benefits out of
the 17.1 million persons who lived in low-income households that participated in food
stamp program (Winicki et al., 2002).
1.2 BACKGROUND INFORMATION
Food stamps are crucial to helping low-wage working families make ends meet. For
example, a family of four supported by a full time, year-round minimum wage worker,
will fall short of the poverty line by 25 percent (even after counting the earned income
tax credit) if the family does not receive food stamps. Food stamps increase the typical
monthly purchasing power of such a family by 39 percent (Center on Budget and Policy
Priorities, 2000 a). Although the Food Stamp Program is not designed to reduce child
poverty, food stamps do augment the purchasing power of low-income households and
can improve the well-being of people living in poverty (Jolliffe et al., 2005).
The health of the general economy affects the food assistance programs. FSP
participation tends to follow the unemployment rate, which is a key indicator of the
health of the general economy. During economic downturn, FSP participation tends to
increase as unemployment increases and income decreases (Hanson and Golan, 2002).
On the other hand, during economic expansion, FSP participation tends to decrease as the
employment rate and income rise. Hanson and Gundersen (2002) argued that general
economic conditions influence the number of people that participate in the FSP. As
household’s income increases, either fewer households are eligible for FSP participation
or the level of FS benefits for eligible households declines. The general state of the
economy influences the expectation of the individuals about their prospects regarding
employment and income and, therefore, influences their decision to participate in the
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FSP. Good economic conditions create the expectation of increased income, better
employment opportunities, and future benefits hence, eligible households may be less
likely to participate in the program (McKernan and Ratcliffe, 2003).
FSP participation showed fluctuation over the years. As indicated in figure 1.1 the
average number of FSP participants declined slowly from 1986-1989, however it grew
substantially during the early 1990s. The average FSP participation declined through
2000 since the peak in 1994, but began to rise in 2001. As illustrated in the figure
unemployment and FSP participation follow similar trend, however, sometimes they
diverge. For example between the years of 1992-1994, the average number of
unemployed individuals declined but the average number of FSP participants increased.
Similarly between 2002 and 2003, the average number of FSP participants was raising
but the average number of unemployed individuals was declining.
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Figure 1.1 Food Stamp Program participants, Unemployed Individuals and
Individuals Living in Poverty (1985-2003) 1

Similarly, FSP participation and poverty it closely related. As illustrated in the above
figure, both had similar trend from 1985-2003 except in 1993, where the average number
of FSP participants rise despite the average number pf people live in poverty declined.

1

Source: Cunnyngham and Brown, 2004
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1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT
West Virginia is one of the nation’s poorest states. Many parts of the state continue to
experience high unemployment, a shrinking economic base, deeply rooted poverty, low
human capital formation, and out-migration (Deavers and Hoppe, 1992). West Virginia
ranks second to last in per capita income and lags the nation and the rest of the
Appalachian region in almost every other indicator measuring income, employment, and
wealth, making it a classical example of persistent poverty (Dilger and Witt, 1994;
Haynes, 1996; Maggard, 1990; U.S. Census Bureau, 2000 a). Slow income and
employment growth, out-migration, and the disappearance of rural households, are causes
and effects of persistently declining public services and high rates of poverty. Lagging
economic development negatively affects the economic and social well-being of West
Virginia’s rural population and the ability of local governments to provide basic social
services (Cushing and Rogers, 1996). These realities have not changed much in recent
years. Recently, West Virginia has experienced very low level of per-capita income,
sluggish economic growth, very low level of educational attainment compared to other
states, loss of non-farm jobs and a rising unemployment rate (WV Economic Outlook,
2001; 2002; 2003; 2004; 2005).
West Virginia has the fourth highest poverty rate following New Mexico,
Louisiana and Mississippi. For the last four consecutive years the poverty rate was more
than 16 percent higher than the national average rate of 12.4 percent. According to the
American Community Survey Report (2005), in 2004, 371,000 people (around 20.4
percent of the population) live in poverty in West Virginia. The poverty rate is even
higher for children below the age of 18. According to the same report 70,000 children
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(24.4 percent) under the age of 18 were living in poverty in 2004. However, little
research has been done on the relationship between FSP participation and
macroeconomic indicators and policy change at the state level. The main focus of this
study is to examine the FSP participation and its relationship with demographic,
economic characteristics and policy factors in West Virginia.

1.4. OBJECTIVES
The overall objective of this study is to examine the pattern of food assistance
participation and its relationship to demographic characteristics, economic development
and policy implications in West Virginia. The specific objectives are to:
1. Determine the relationship between food assistance participation and macro
economic indicators such as employment, unemployment, Income, poverty
level and price index, and policy measures.
2. Draw relevant policy implications from the empirical findings and analysis of
the study.

1.5 HYPOTHESIS
Based on economic theory and previous study results, it is expected that the explanatory
variables will have the following hypothesized relationships with FSP participation:
Hypothesis 1: County employment growth (or decline in unemployment rate) reduces the
proportion of county population dependent on food stamps.
Hypothesis 2: Counties experiencing increase in per capita income face declining FSP
participation.
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Hypothesis 3: A rise in poverty rate in a county increases the proportion of county
population participating in the FSP.
Hypothesis 4: A rise in the cost of living (measured by the consumer price index) in the
economy increases FSP participants.
Hypothesis 5: The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunities Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) is effective in reducing county FSP participants.

1.6. APPROACH
The study employs both static and dynamic econometric models to determine the
relationship between county socio-economic conditions and food stamp caseloads. Static
models enable the determination of economic relationships at a point in time. This
property of static models allows the use of comparative static properties to study the
relationship between dependent and independent variables at a particular point in time.
Dynamic models help in understanding the relationship between variables over a
period of time. In these models, the pattern of relationship among current and lagged
variables over a number of years is established for empirical analysis.

1.7. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY
Chapter One includes the problem statement, background information, objective of the
study, approach and organization of the study. Chapter Two provides an extensive
literature review on the relationship between food stamp and economic and demographic
factors. In Chapter Three, the theoretical background of individual decision to participate
in the program is presented with the description of variables. Chapter Four illustrates the
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model of estimation. Chapter Five the presents empirical estimation procedures and
analysis of research result. Chapter Six summarizes the results, provides some
conclusions, and addresses some limitation of the study and suggestion for future
research.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1 BACKGROUND OF THE FOOD STAMP PROGRAM
The first U.S. food assistance program was established during the depression of 1930s.
The goal of the food assistance program was to stabilize farm prices and incomes. The
government purchased surplus agricultural products from producers and redistributed to
the poor and, therefore, kept farm prices and incomes from declining. During the 1960s,
the assistance program became independent of the farm assistance program and focused
on the food and nutritional need of the society (Kuhn et al., 1996).
The Food Stamp Program began as a small pilot program in 1961. The program
expanded during the 1960s and early 1970s, and finally reached nationwide coverage in
1975. The Food Stamp Act of 1964 introduced the first coupon-based system which
allowed program participants to buy a variety of food with coupons rather than restricting
their consumption to surplus commodities. Participants purchased food stamp coupons
for an amount based on income and household size and would receive some free “bonus
stamp” (Fox et al., 2004).
With the introduction of National eligibility standards in 1971, all states were
required to inform low income households about the availability of food stamps. Due to
the concern of low participation in the food stamp program, in 1977 the requirement of
the household to purchase food stamp coupons with cash was eliminated. Under this act
households would receive fewer coupons but did not pay for them. However, the
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elimination of the purchase requirement of coupons did not change the net dollar value of
the subsidy received by the household (Kuhn et al., 1996).
Direct changes to the FSP during 1980-98 were comparatively modest. In 1981,
the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA 81) and the FS and Commodity
Distribution Amendments of 1981 for the first time applied the gross income eligibility
standards to all households not including aged or disabled members. The Farm Security
Act of 1985 raised the asset limit to $2,000 for non-elderly households and to $3,000 for
elderly households. In 1988, the Hunger Prevention Act reduced the maximum food
stamp allotment incrementally from 200 percent to 103 percent of the Thrifty Food Plan.
The Thrifty Food Plan, developed by USDA, serves as a national standard for a nutritious
diet at low cost. It represent a set of market baskets of food that people of specific age
and gender consume at home to maintain a healthy diet that meets dietary standards, by
taking into consideration the food consumption pattern of U.S households. The cost of
the meal plan for each category of gender and age is calculated based on average national
food prices adjusted inflation. Furthermore, the cost of the market basket for a household
is adjusted by the size of the household (Nord, 2005).
In 1996, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
(PRWORA) was enacted. PRWORA was the most significant social welfare legislation
with direct and indirect implication on Food Stamp Program. PRWORA introduced a 3
month benefit limit in every 36 months for able-bodied individuals (between the ages of
18-49) without dependents who are not working or participating in approved workrelated programs at least for 20 hours. The Act also restricted eligibility of most legal
immigrants except for some refugees, military personnel on active duty, naturalized
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citizens, permanent resident aliens, veterans or their spouses. Moreover, the act gave
states power to reduce or eliminate food stamp benefits upon the failure of the adult in the
household to comply with the rules of other public assistance programs (Wilde et al.,
2000). The act also reduced maximum food stamp benefit from 103 percent to 100
percent of Thrifty Food Plan.

The Act also terminated the Aid to Families with

Dependent Children (AFDC) and replaced it with Temporary Assistant for Needy
Families (TANF), a new block grant (a financial aid package that grants federal money to
state and local governments for use in social welfare programs) to fund state welfare
programs.
The FSP has undergone significant regulatory and legislative changes since the
enactment of PRWORA. Some of the changes are aimed to reverse the previous rules and
others are directed to increase states’ flexibility in their program administration. In 2002,
the Food Security and Rural Investment Act of 2002 was enacted. The major changes
included: restoration of eligibility to qualified aliens who have been in United States at
least for five years, restoration of eligibility for immigrants receiving certain disability
payment and for children regardless of their stay in the country, and it removed time
limits on FS eligibility for refugees and people who granted asylum. The Act provides
options for the states to simplify the program, adopt a simplified reporting system and
providing transitional benefits for clients leaving TANF. Moreover, the Act modified the
standard deduction applied to income when determining benefit, so that the deduction is
scaled to family size and indexed to inflation (Mathematica Policy Research Inc., 2003).

12

2.2 FOOD STAMP ELIGIBILITY AND BENEFIT
Food Stamps provide resources for individuals to buy certain food items from stores. The
items that can be bought with food stamps include: food items from stores and meals
prepared and served by authorized meal delivery service. However, medicines, vitamins,
alcoholic beverages, cigarettes, pet food, non food items such as paper products and
household supplies cannot be purchased with food stamps.

2.2.1 Program Eligibility
Not all low-income households are eligible for benefits from the FSP. There are certain
financial and work-related requirements households must meet to be eligible for the FSP.
Financial criteria include the gross income test, the net-income test, and the asset test.
A household’s gross income before taxes in the previous month must be at or
below 130 percent of the federal poverty line to meet the gross income criteria. However,
households with any member over the age of 60 or disabled are exempted from gross
income test. In addition to these tests, households must have net monthly income at or
below 100 percent of the federal poverty line to pass the net income test for eligibility.
The maximum gross and net income that different household size should earn to qualify
in the program is indicated in Table 2.1. In addition, income-eligible households must
have liquid asset less than $2,000 to qualify in the program ($3,000 for the households
with someone over age of 60 and households with a disabled member, as of 2002).
However, in the determination of eligibility the value of a residence, personal property,
earned income tax credit payments, life insurance, and pension assets, are excluded.
Work related eligibility conditions require able-bodied household members to register for
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work, accept suitable job offers, and comply with State welfare agency work for training
programs (Fox et al., 2004).
Table 2.1. Gross and Net Income Eligibility Standard, Effective October 2004 to
September 2005.
Household Size
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
Each additional
member

Gross monthly income
(130 percent of poverty)
1,009
1,354
1,698
2,043
2,387
2,732
3,076
3,421
+345

Net monthly income
(100 percent of poverty)
776
1,041
1,306
1,571
1,836
2,101
2,366
2,631
+265

Source: USDA, Food and Nutrition Service 2

However, some groups are categorically ineligible for the FSP whether or not
they fulfill all the requirements for eligibility. These include, for example, people who are
not citizens or permanent residents, postsecondary students, and people living in
institutional settings. However, households in which all members receive Temporary
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), Supplementary Security Income (SSI), or
general assistance are exempted from both the income and asset test (Kornfeld, 2002)

2.2.2 Program Benefits
Eligible households are issued a monthly allotment of food stamps based on the Thrifty
Food Plan, the national standard established by USDA for determining the low-cost
nutritious diet for different household size. The amount of food stamp benefit the
household receives varies by size of the household and is subject to annual adjustment for
2

http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/faqs.htm#13
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the changes in the cost of the Thrifty Food Plan. An individual household'
s food stamp
allotment is equal to the maximum allotment for that household'
s size determined by
thrifty plan less 30 percent of the household'
s net income. For example households with
no countable income receive $393 per month in Fiscal Year 2005 for a household of four
people, the maximum allotment for this household size. Table 2.2 shows the maximum
amount of food stamp benefit for different family sizes as of October 2004 to September
2005.
Table 2.2. Maximum Benefit per Family Size from Oct 2004-Sept 2005
Number in
Household
Maximum
monthly benefit

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

149

274

393

499

592

711

786

898

Each additional
person
+112

Source: USDA, Food and Nutrition Service3

The amount of FS benefit alloted for a given household size is uniform across the
United States. All participants receive the same level of benefits based on their income,
regardless of their geographic location (except in Alaska, Hawaii, and the Virgin Islands
where benefit levels are higher because of higher food prices).
Historically, FS benefits were issued in the form of paper coupons. FS recipients
used these coupons for food at authorized stores. In 1996, PRWORA mandated that all
FS benefits be distributed via electronic transfers; therefore, FS benefits are now paid
through Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT), an ATM-like card used to make food
purchases at grocery stores by deducting the purchase amount from the recipient’s
monthly food stamp amount. The use of EBT card is expected to help enhance security
and reduce the stigma often associated with receiving food stamp benefits. EBT system

3

http://www.fns.usda.gov/fsp/faqs.htm#13
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became operational in all states at different time. For instance, only two counties of West
Virginia adopt this technology in 2002 and by 2003, all counties started to distribute
benefits via the EBT card.

2.3 HISTORICAL TREND OF FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
The FSP participation rate “the percentage of eligible people who actually participate in
the FSP” is an important measure of how well the program is reaching its target
population. Not all of those who are eligible participate in the program as some choose
not to participate, while others are not aware that they are eligible.
Table 2.3 Rate of Food Stamp Participation (1976-2002)
Participation Rate (%)
Year
Individuals
Households
September 1976
31.1
32.6
February 1978
38.3
37.8
August 1980
55.2
52.5
August 1982
52.2
51.5
August 1984
51.8
51.6
August 1986
47.6
46.5
August 1988
48.1
47.1
August 1990
54.2
54.9
August 1991
57.0
59.1
August 1992
59.3
61.6
August 1993
60.3
64.0
August 1994
61.4
64.6
September 1994
74.8
69.6
September 1995
72.7
69.2
September 1996
69.2
65.1
September 1997
64.0
57.5
September 1998
59.8
54.2
September 1999
57.9
53.0
FY 1999
56.2
51.7
FY 2000
55.7
50.1
FY 2001
53.2
48.0
FY 2002
53.8
48.3
Source: FS Program Operations Data. FSPQC (Food Stamp Program Quality
Control) Data, and CPS Data for the year the years shown.
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Based on the data reported in Table 2.3, individual participation rates increased
substantially in the late 1970s, from 31 percent in 1976 to 55 percent in 1980. FSP
participation rates then leveled off, declining slightly to 48 percent by 1988. Through the
late 1980s and early 1990s, FSP participation rates rose rapidly, peaking in 1994 before
beginning a seven-year decline. Similarly household participation increased significantly
in late 1970s from 33 percent to 53 percent in 1984. Household participation dramatically
declined between 1986 and 1988, and substantially increased after 1990 until 1996.
Participation declined each year after 1997 until 1999 and started to rise until 2002 as
shown in table 2.3.

2.3.1 Food Stamp Program Participation Rate among Subgroups
FSP participation rates vary by demographic and economic subgroups. Historically,
participation rates have been relatively high for individuals in households with very low
incomes, children and TANF and Supplemental Security Income (SSI) recipients.
Conversely, participation rates have been relatively low for households with elderly
member (Cunnyngham, 2004).
According to (Mathematica Policy Research Inc., 2003), the majority (54 percent)
of food stamp recipients was households with children in 2002. Of these households, 63.6
percent were single parent households, 17.6 percent were headed by married parents, and
10.8 percent had no members over the age of 17 participating in the FSP (the remaining
8.0 percent were other multiple adult households with children). Households with the
elderly member represented 18.7 percent of all food stamp households. Over threequarters of them (80.2 percent) lived alone and received an average monthly benefit of
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$50. Households containing the elderly and other individuals, either elderly or nonelderly, received an average benefit of $121. Over one-quarter (27 percent) of food stamp
households contained disabled individuals. Of these households, over half (58.7 percent)
lived alone, receiving an average benefit of $50. Households with the disabled and others,
either disabled or non-disabled, received an average benefit of $187. Households without
children, elderly, or disabled adults, received an average benefit of $122. Households
with multiple non-elderly, non-disabled adults and no children received an average
benefit of $201. Participation rates for different household characteristics for the period
of 1994 to 2002 are depicted in Table 2.4.
Table 2.4. FSP Rate, Number of Eligible Individuals and Participating Individuals among
Subgroups (1994-2002)
1994 1995 1996
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Individuals in All Households
74.8 72.7
69.2
64.0 59.8 57.9 59.3 53.2 53.8
Age of Individuals
Children
89.6 86.8
85.6
75.7 70.7 67.9 71.8 69.1 70.3
Non-elderly Adults (18-59)
74.2 71.2
68.7
65.8 60.3 58.1 59.9 49.4 49.9
Elderly Individuals
35.7 36.1
29.7
29.8 30.9 32.9 30.7 28.1 26.9
Disabled Non-Elderly Individuals
49.0 53.6
49.0
54.1 52.5 59.3 53.1 44
46
Non-Disabled Childless Adults Subject to Work
47.7 41.3
37.0
40.1 24.4 24.9 27.1 19.3 20
Registration
Non-citizens
66.8 66.0
64.5
77.7 63.0 49.4 44.7 37.2 43.7
Citizen Children Living with Non-citizen Adults
80.5 59.8
58.3
38.7 39.3 45.6 38.1 37.2 43.7
Individual in Households Without Any Non-citizens
76.0 75.9
72.3
63.8 61.4 60.4 61.8 57.0 57.9
or Non-disabled Childless Adults Subject to Work
Registration
Household Composition
Households with Children
87.2 84.4
82.7
74.6 69.8 67.1 70.7 64.7 65.4
Single-Parent
98.9 100.8 96.3
86.3 84.6 81.4 90.7 93.8 96.1
Married Couple
67.6 61.6
62.1
62.1 52.3 45.6 47.1 44.1 44.7
Other Multiple Adults
89.0 73.6
75.2
78.1 67.3 73.7 67.0 41.4 39.2
Children Only
78.1 62.9
80.3
36.6 36.6 44.5 39.9 46.3 56.5
Households without Children
45.8 45.3
40.3
40.6 38.6 39.4 38.0 32.9 33.2
Source: FS Program Operations Data. FSPQC (Food Stamp Program Quality Control) Data, and CPS Data
for the year the years shown.

The FSP participation rate for the elderly (over the age of 60) has been generally
low for the last decade. Based on FS Program Operation and CPS (Current Population
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Survey) data participation rate was 36 percent in 1994 and fell to 27 percent in 2002.
Similarly, participation rate of non-elderly adults were 74 percent in 1994 and fell to 50
percent in 2000. The Household Characteristics Survey conducted in 2000 also supports
the report of USDA 2002 regarding low participation rate of elderly as reported by
Gunderson and Oliveira (2001). According to the result of the survey, out of the total
participants, only 5 percent of the benefit is accounted by the household headed by 60
years of age or older. Households with some of its members over the age of 60 years are
less likely to be food insufficient than average households; therefore, these low levels of
food insufficiency appear to influence their low participation rate (Gunderson and
Oliveira, 2001).
FSP participation for children generally had been higher than the other age
groups. For the period between 1994 and 2002, participation was the highest in 1994 and
lowest in 1999, 90 and 68 percent, respectively as indicated in table 2.4. Moreover the
table indicated that over half of the total participants were children. More than half of the
eligible non-elderly adults (18-59 years) had been participating from 1994 to 2002. Based
on FS Program Operation and CPS data, Hanson and Gundersen (2002) reported that the
participation rates in 1999 and 2000 were 58 and 60 percent, respectively.

2.3.2 Food Stamp Program Entry and Exit
It is a common phenomenon that FSP participants leave the program and re-enter again
more than once in their life time. Rank and Hirschl (2003) noted that participating in the
eligible food stamp program is very common for both children (age 1-20) and working
age-adults (20-59). Their result indicated that 49 percent of the eligible children have
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received food stamps at some point by the time they reached 20 years of age, and 51
percent of eligible adults participated in FSP sometime between 20 and 65 years of age.
Re-entry in FSP is a common practice. Gleason et al. (1998) indicated that more
than half of those who left FSP re-entered within two years. They also found that two
third of the new participants are previously used food stamps, which suggests that
individuals who had previously received food stamps are more likely to enter the
program in a given month than those who had never received food stamps. Using 1990
and 1991 Survey of Income and Program participation (SIPP) data they found that about
two thirds of all people who entered the FSP experienced a 20 percent drop in household
income sometime during the four months before they started receiving food stamps.
Similarly, about two third of those who stop receiving food stamps experienced a 20
percent increase in income around the time they left the program. Furthermore, the study
indicated that, about one third of the entrants had faced both a decrease in household
income and some change in the composition of their households (such as departure of a
spouse) during the eight months before they started receiving food stamp.
Household’s structure such as marital status, race and level of education can
influence FSP participation. Rank and Hirschl (2003) investigated the implication of
household’s structure on FSP participation. The study noted that race, level of education,
and marital status has a substantial influence on the probability that the individual would
use food stamps. The study also reported that African Americans, people who have not
graduated from high school and children residing in non married households have a
higher probability of using food stamp over the course of their lives. For example, 90
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percent of African Americans used food stamps at some point during their childhood
compared with 37 percent of white children.
FSP participation span might differ with regard to household structures. Singlefemales with children, elderly people with disabilities, and low income households
whose members have not worked recently participate in FSP longer than the others.
Furthermore, the increase in the unemployment rate and falling wages in the
manufacturing industry leads to longer stays in the program for able bodied participants
without children (Gleason et al., 1998).
Previous studies employing static models found that the FSP participation rate is
high among non-elderly and those who participate in other public assistance programs.
Everything else held constant, those households receiving AFDC, living in poverty, and
no longer receiving food stamps, are much more likely to re-enter the program than their
counterparts. In addition, individuals in households with children (especially single
parents with children) are more likely to enter the program than those in households
without children (Gleason et al., 1998).
Based on the 1997 National Survey of America’s Families (NSAF), Zedlewski
and Brauner (1999) reported that families receiving FS who had been on welfare left FSP
at significantly higher rate than their non-welfare counterparts even if they appear to be
eligible at all levels of income. The findings of the survey also showed that 62 percent of
the former welfare recipient families left the FSP compared to 46 percent of non-welfare
recipients. However, significantly more welfare families that left the program fell into the
lowest income group - below 50 percent of poverty level - than the non-welfare receivers.
In fact, the rate of FSP participation of former welfare recipient families that were
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eligible for benefit was very low even at very low income levels. For instance, in 1997
only 4 out of 10 families were participating (Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999).
The study also identified the most common reason families gave for leaving the
FSP. The major reason given by the respondents was increase in earning or finding a new
job, including those with extremely low income. However, whether the families left the
program based on their assumption of not being qualified for the program or they
preferred to stop the program after they began working was unclear.
The second most common reason given by the respondents for leaving the FSP
was administrative problems. The poorest families in both the welfare and non-welfare
groups were considerably more likely to leave the program due to administrative
problems than relatively higher income families. The study also indicated that families
that are not on welfare are more likely to give administrative reasons for leaving the
program, which suggests that families without cash assistance are more likely to struggle
to maintain the program requirement for eligibility. However, why former welfare
families left the FSP more often than non-welfare families at similar income level is
unknown (Zedlewski and Brauner, 1999).
2.4 TRENDS IN FOOD STAMP CASELOADS (1994-2000)
The monthly rate of participation in the FSP has fluctuated greatly over time due to
changes in eligibility requirements, fluctuations in economic activity and improvements
in the accessibility of program benefits, changes in other federal programs such as
Medicaid, changes in federal immigration policy, and changes in the behavior of
households. These various factors resulted in a rising caseloads during the late 1970s and
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early 1980s, a declining caseload during the middle and late 1980s, a rising caseload
during the early 1990s, and substantial declining after mid 1990s until 1999.
The unprecedented decline in FSP participation during 1994-1999 attracts a great
deal of attention from both policy makers and researchers. Several studies such as Ziliak
et al. (1997); Blank (1997); Wilde et al. (2000); Grogger (2001); Martini and Wiseman
(1997); Figlio et al. (2000); Jacobson et al. (2001); and Danziger (1999) documented that
economic conditions were a significant factor in explaining the drop in FS caseloads
during this period. Similarly, policy changes, such as the enactment of the Personal
Responsibility Act of 1996, had also played a role to the decline in the food stamp
caseload. The most direct impact of this policy change was the disqualification of the
eligibility of some of legal immigrants and adults between ages 18-50 without-children.
Gleason et al. (2000), using a multivariate model, investigated FSP participation
caseloads for the same period of time and showed that 40 percent of the decline is
explained by economic factors such as employment and unemployment rate, 2 percent by
work requirement, 23 percent by TANF and the remaining is explained by other factors.
Employing micro-simulation methodology, Jacobson and Puffer (2000) simulated the
impact of economic change and pointed out that of the predicted 11.5 percent reduction
in participation, 35.5 percent was explained by policy change under the welfare reform
and 64.5 to change in unemployment rate. Wallace and Blank (1999) using both static
annual and dynamic monthly food stamp caseload models based on state level panel data,
found that food stamp caseloads strongly countercyclical with the state of macroeconomy
and that the reform of AFDC led to weak decline in total caseload. Specifically,
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economic condition such as employment and unemployment was responsible for 44
percent of the decline and about 6 percent of the decline impacted by welfare reform.
Wilde (2001) reported that detailed welfare policy change had little effect which
ranged from 0 to 2 percent, while 23 percent of the decline was associated with the
implementation of the 1996 welfare reform. Likewise, Ziliak et al. (2000) estimated the
impact of welfare reform and business cycle on food stamp caseload decline by
employing dynamic model as a function of phase caseload, economic factors, AFDC and
FS policies, political factors, AFDC caseload level, and unobserved fixed and trending
heterogeneity. The results suggested that the robust economy substantially influenced the
decline of FS caseload but the estimated aggregate effect of welfare reform was modest.
Wilde et al. (2000) using state level data from 1994 to 1998 found that 35, 23 and 12
percent of participation decline resulted from change in economic conditions, program
reform, and political variables, respectively. Similarly, using household level data it was
found that 28 percent of the change in the participation rate was associated with the
decrease in the number of people with annual income below 130 percent of poverty line.
Another 55 percent of the total change was due to a decline in the proportion of low
income people who participated in FSP and the result was due to economic or policy
change or both.
FS benefits are now paid through an EBT card by deducting the purchased
amount from the recipients’ monthly benefit. The use of EBT card protects the individual
from revealing him/her self as a food stamp user to others in a way that the coupon does
(Banks, 2003). The Ponza et al. (1999) survey found that non-participant eligible
individuals were more likely to participate in FSP benefits if the benefits were provided
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through EBT cards than coupons. However, with low checking account holding among
low income households, the ATM type technology underlying the EBT may be a
hindrance to some households (Hurst et al. 1998). Ziliak et al. (2000) indicated that states
implementing EBT program experienced about 5.5 percent decline in their per capita
food stamp caseloads, suggesting that the stigma reducing effect that should increase
caseload in the presence of the EBT is dominated by technological barriers that prevent
its use.

2.5 FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION AND FOOD INSUFFICIENCY
Despite the wealth of the nation and abundant food supply, and relatively low food
prices, many households are food insecure or do not have assured access to enough food
to meet their dietary needs for active and healthy lives. Food insecurity has been a
significant public health concern. Lack of a healthy diet can affect people’s quality of life
and result in poor health outcomes.
Food insecurity has been closely related to health problems including increased
risk in the development of chronic diseases. Frazao (1996); and Pena and Bacallao (2002)
showed that physically inactive adults with poor diets faced a high probability of heart
diseases, cancer, strokes, high blood pressure, and diabetes. The impairment of
psychological and cognitive function and obesity are the major health problems resulted
from poor diet among children.
For the last decades, evidence indicated that hunger and food insecurity have
become a serious issue in the nation. Based on Census Bureau survey, Nord et al. (2003)
reported that food insecurity and hunger increased in USA in 2002 for the third
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consecutive year. Food insecurity increased by 3.9 million people between 1999 and
2002. Of the increased food insecure people, 2.8 million were adults and more than one
million were children. In 2002, 11.1 percent of US households (around 35 million people
from 12.1 million households) experienced food insecurity compared to 33 and 31
million people in 2001 and 1999, respectively. About one-third of food-insecure
households (3.8 million, or 3.5 percent of all U.S. households) were food insecure to the
extent that one or more household members were hungry, at least some time during the
year, because they could not afford to have enough food (Nord et al.,2003).
There have been many initiatives by policy makers in identifying effective
policies that can reduce food insecurity and address the food needs of vulnerable groups.
To address this problem, 15 domestic food assistance programs administered by USDA
have become the major safety net for children and low income adults in which food
stamp has been the largest one.
With some exceptions (asset and financial requirements) food stamps are
available for all low income households and generally it is expected that low income
families would be the beneficiaries of the program. However, Jensen (2002) indicated
that not all households that experienced food insecurity participated in the food stamp
program in the same year. For example, only 42 percent of the households that
experienced hunger participated in FSP during the past year. This evidence indicates that
many eligible households do not participate in the program and also many of the eligible
non-participants may experience food insecurity. Multivariate analysis indicated that the
degree of food insecurity is positively correlated with the likelihood of FSP participation,
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and that the labor market and program parameters have a relatively larger effect on more
food insecure households than on others.
The contribution of food stamps to reducing food insecurity has been studied by
some researchers. Increase in food stamp benefit increased FSP participation and
decreased the food insecurity with hunger according to Huffman and Jensen (2003).
Their findings implied that FSP participation and food insecurity with hunger among low
income and low asset households that are potentially eligible for FSP are sensitive to
changes in program parameters (e.g., food stamp benefit). Further, their results suggested
that greater reduction in food insecurity can be achieved through increase in FS benefit
and improvement of macroeconomic conditions,
In contrast food insecurity was worse among food stamp recipients than among
eligible non-participants and near-eligible individuals (Cohen et al., 1999). Their estimate
unveiled that half of all the food stamp recipients experienced some kind of food
insecurity. Similarly, by employing simultaneous equations, Gunderson and Oliveira
(2001) indicated that food insufficient families are more likely to receive food stamps and
FSP participants are much more than twice as likely to be food insufficient than non
participants while treating the program participation as exogenous variable.
Huffman and Jensen (2003) examined the relationship among FSP participation,
labor participation, and food insecurity by employing a simultaneous equation model.
They found that if the head of the family is male or married, then the probability that
household participants in FSP is significantly lower and the probability that the
household head works is significantly higher. They found lower FSP participation for
married families, a negative relationship between food participation and labor supply and
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negative relationship between food insecurity with hunger and labor force participation.
Likewise, an additional hour of working leads to decreased FSP participation and
increased food security. The marginal effects of one dollar increase in expected FS
benefits on FSP participation is similar to a one dollar increase in minimum food
spending needs: both increase FSP participation by approximately 0.10 percent points,
(Jensen, 2002).
Cross sectional studies have generated a variety of conflicting results. For
instance, Rose et al. (1998) estimated the effects of different economic and demographic
variables on food insufficiency using national sample data. They noted that food
insufficiency fell with rising income, food stamp benefit, education, and with home
ownership. They also found that household structure, race, and ethnicity are important
factors in explaining food insufficiency.
Similarly, single female headed households were 4 percent more likely to
participate in the FSP and 5 percent more likely to be food insecure than others (Hanson
and Golan, 2002). Winship and Jencks (2002) indicated that single mothers had higher
rate of food insufficiency problem than married mothers, but both groups experienced a
similar decline in problems over the late 1990s. Likewise, female-headed households
were significantly more likely to be food insufficient than other households. In addition,
disability status and changes in household’s composition appear to be associated with
entry in food insufficiency. On the other hand, completing high school was consistently
found to increase the chance of being food secure (Nord et al., 2003).
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2.6 FOOD STAMP EXPENDITURE AND THE ECONOMY
Considerable research has revealed that FSP participation is responsive to changes in
economic conditions. During economic downturn, participation rates tend to increase as
unemployment rate increased and income is reduced. On the other hand, during economic
expansion FSP participation tends to decrease as the employment rate and income rises.
Hanson and Gundersen (2002) stated that general economic conditions influence the
number of people to participate in FSP in ways that as households income increase, either
fewer households are eligible or the level of benefit for eligible households decline. They
also pointed out that the general state of the economy influences the expectation of the
individual about their prospects regarding employment and income and, therefore,
influences their decision to participate in the program.
Using CPS and FSP administrative data, Cunnyngham (2004) reported that FSP
participation is substantially higher for individuals in the household without income than
for individuals in the household with income. For example, in 2002, 67 percent of
members in the household without income participated as compared to 50 percent of
individuals in the household with income. Similar to this result, Ponza et al. (1999), using
National Food Stamp Program Survey (NFSPS) collected between 1996 and 1997, stated
that food stamp participants are more likely to have no earned income than eligible non
participants. They reported that 52.7 percent of FSP eligible non-participant households
have earned income as compared to 32.5 percent of participants. They also indicated that
there is a negative relationship among FSP participation, number of jobs held, and
number of hours worked by adult household member.
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The opposite is also true; an economic downturn increases FSP participation since
it creates low work opportunities, fewer hours of available work, and a higher
unemployment rate (Hanson and Gundersen, 2002). Lower income implies that new
households become eligible to participate in FSP and also families already participating
in the program receive more benefits. However, they also indicated that the economy has
less direct effect on the household participation whose members have limited attachment
on labor force such as the disabled, elderly, and single women with young children.
Hanson and Golan (2002) were also investigated the impact of food stamp
spending on stabilizing the economy. These countercyclical changes in food stamp
expenditure during economic boom and downturn can have beneficial stabilization effect
to the economy, stimulating economic activity during recession and slowing demand
during an expansion. The effect of FSP expenditure on the economy during economic
downturn can be evaluated in terms of source of expenditure finance: expenditure
generated through emergency or contingency funding, and funds generated through
increased tax or other budget neutral financing.
At the time of recession, FSP expenditures increase through government
emergency finance to provide more benefits to more households. The increase in
spending by the benefit recipients due to the rise in FS expenditure stimulates production.
The resulting higher production boosts labor market demand and household income and
consequently the increase in income triggers additional spending. To understand the
likely impact of additional expenditure in FS benefit, Hanson and Golan (2002)
investigated the effect of recession-driven increase in FSP spending through emergency
borrowing by hypothetically increasing the annual FSP expenditure by $5 billion (lower
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than the actual spending increase). According to their estimate, the $5 billion rise in the
FSP expenditure resulted in $1.3 billion increase in food items spending by the recipients
of the households. By assuming that the households now allocate their previous income
devoted on food to non-food items, they found that non-food spending increased by $3.7
billion. Ultimately, the additional $5 billion expenditure triggered economic activity of
$9.2 billion and increase in jobs of 82,100, out of which 8,800 jobs accounted for farm
and food processing sector and 73,300 for nonfood sectors. Likewise, Hanson et. al.
(2002) showed the role of FSP expenditure on farm and food processing sector by
converting the FSP to cash assistance program. It was indicated that converting $18.5
billion FSP to cash assistance would lead to a reduction in farm and food processing
production of $3.5 billion, as households shifted expenditures from food to other goods
and services.
Hanson et al. (2002) also examined the possible implication of food stamp
expenditure on the economy, especially on farm and food processing sector, if the
program is financed thorough tax increment. They hypothetically increased both FSP
benefits and personal income taxes by $5 billion. The increase in benefit due to rise in
FSP expenditure resulted in rise in spending by recipient households in food and nonfood
items. However, the rise in spending of the recipient households was offset by a decline
in spending by tax paying households. As a result of increase in benefit expenditure
through budgetary neutral spending by low-income households there was an increase by
$1.357 and 3.608 billion on food goods and nonfood goods and services, respectively.
Mid and high income households cut spending by $159 million and non food spending by
$5.491 billion. Even though production increased in farm and food processing sector and
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job increased by 7,870 due to the redistribution of the expenditure, total economy
declined by almost $1 billion with a loss of 14,000 jobs. The non-farm and non-food
processing sector of the economy declined, losing 22,270 jobs. Similarly, they
investigated the effect of increase in personal income tax to finance FSP expenditure. It
was estimated that increasing personal income taxes by $1 billion to offset the additional
FSP expenditure resulted in an overall loss of 3,000 jobs and farm sales rise by $81
million and with 880 jobs added.
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CHAPTER 3
THEORETICAL BASIS FOR FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION DECISIONS
3.1 FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION DECISION
Despite the potential value of food stamps, many eligible households do not participate in
the program, and participation rates have dropped significantly in recent years. For
example, it is estimated that 54 percent of eligible households participated in food stamps
program during 1999–2001, which was lower than in 1994 with 70 percent participation
rate (Zedlewski and Rader, 2004).
Literature provides two general explanations regarding non-participation for the
eligible households in the FSP. The first reason focuses on the unawareness or lack of
information about the program and its potential benefit by low income families
(McConnell and Ponza, 1999). If the households or individuals are unaware of the
eligibility, they do not apply for public assistance program regardless of their expected
benefit level or the relative direct and psychological costs of participation (Banks, 2003).
Some needy households do not participate because they do not know about the program,
or more likely, believe that they are not eligible for the benefit.
Previous studies, for example, Coe (1986), agreed that lack of information played
an important role for the low level FSP participation of eligible households. Using
information from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, Coe (1986) indicated that 50
percent of non-participating eligible households reported that lack of information was
their primary reason for not participating in the program. Blaylock and Smallwood
(1984) using 1979-80 survey of Food Consumption in low income households, indicated
that lack of knowledge about the FSP, eligibility levels and application procedure were
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the most mentioned reasons for non-participation. Kim and Mergoupis (1997) similarly
reported that lack of information contributed for non-participating in FSP. Ponza et al.
(1999) suggested that even prior exposure to public assistance program might not provide
adequate information regarding the eligibility of the program. The authors found that
almost three fourths of non-participating eligible households reported that they were
unaware of their eligibility. Most households with prior participation in food stamp
program also reported that they were unaware of their eligibility.
Other researchers (Ranney and Kushman, 1987) indicated that households have
sufficient information regarding the availability and benefit of the FSP but they decide
whether to participate in the program or not after weighing the expected costs and
benefits associated with FSP participation. If the expected benefit is higher than the
expected cost, households will participate in the program, and vise versa. Non
participation can be explained either by low expected benefit level or high expected cost
of participation, or both. When the expected benefits are lower than the expected cost of
participation, eligible households choose not to participate even though they may be
entitled to modest assistance (Ranney and Kushman, 1987). Similarly, a recent study by
Lerman and Wiseman (2002) suggested that costs and benefits of participation played an
important role in making participation decision. Individuals participate in FSP if the
utility of participation in the program is higher than the utility of non-participation.

3.2 COST AND BENEFIT OF FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
Participation in FSP involves both benefits and costs to the eligible household. The
primary benefit of FSP participation is that it provides households resources to purchase
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nutritional food and improve their health. Once the household is eligible, the amount of
FS benefit received is determined based on several factors such as: earned income,
unearned income, allowable income deductions, household compositions, and year. The
amount of benefit is higher for households with lower earned and unearned income as
well as for households with higher income deductions such as shelter and medical
expense.
The compositions of households also determine the amount of benefit, as the
amount of food stamp benefit increases with the number of persons in the household. FSP
participation rates declined sharply with income relative to need and this income relative
to need is a function of both household income and household size (Zedlewski and
Brauner, 1999). The time period of food stamp receipt is also related to the benefit of
participation as there have been changes both in policies and the amount of benefit of
participation over time.
Non-market costs (transaction and stigma) are involved in FSP participation
decision. Transaction costs of participation include, but not limited to, out of pocket cost
of transportation to public assistance offices, incremental costs of documenting additional
family members, the time costs of going to the food stamp office and waiting in public
assistance offices, and time spent to gather information and documentation for the
program application. Ponza et al. (1999) indicated that individuals spend roughly an
average of five hours applying for food stamps and two and half hours to recertify
benefits.
Loss of earning is also one of the costs the participant household faces since some
workers may have to miss work in order to recertify for benefit during office hours. This
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increases the opportunity cost of participation especially for those who work during
traditional working hours as the food stamp office is open during the same hours. Due to
the time taken for the intensive application and recertification process, the cost of
participation for these eligible groups of people is very high (McKernan and Ratcliffe,
2003). Examining the relationship between FSP participation and detailed employment
characteristics using data from 1990 and 1996 panel of Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), McKernan and Ratcliffe (2003) found that individuals in households
where adults work traditional daytime hours are less likely to participate in FSP than
individuals in the households where adults work in non-traditional hours. This implies
that working in traditional day time hours makes it difficult for the individuals to go to
office to apply and certify for the FSP.
Participation in the program also causes a stigma4 cost or disutility to the
household. Stigma cost may be incurred during the application and certification process
(Ranney and Kushman, 1987). The applicant may feel stigmatized by being seen going
into the food stamp office, being identified as a poor by others, or having to reveal
personal information to workers. Stigma cost may also occur as the person uses the
coupon card every time store purchases are made.

3.3 THEORETICAL MODEL OF FOOD STAMP PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
One of the basic assumptions in microeconomic theory is that rational individuals choose
bundles of goods and services that maximize their utility based on, among other things,

4

According to Weisbrod (1970, pp 2-3) stigma is describes as “ … the desire of the “poor” or “needy” to retain self
respect, dignity and acceptance from the rest of the society, and in particular the desire not have other people know
about poverty,…(or) private life.”
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income, preference, and relative prices. For FSP eligible households, utility maximization
depends on income, preference, relative prices, program participation decisions, both
benefits and costs associated with program participation and characteristics of the
households. To maximize utility, the eligible household must first make the FSP
participation decision and then determine the level of food demand (out of their income)
and other non-food goods and services as part of income allocation process. Eligible
households may make the rational choice not to participate in the program by forgoing
additional resources from food stamps if the cost of participation in FSP is higher than its
benefit. The following theoretical model of FSP participation decision is developed
following Ranney and Kushman (1987).
The utility function can be represented as:
U = U ( H , FY + FS , R, M )

(3.1)

where FY + FS = FT and R = R( FS , M ) ; H is a Hicksian composite of all non-food goods
and services, FY is food bought with cash, FS is food purchased with stamps, FT
represents total food consumption from cash and food stamps, R is a composite
representing the household’s status or prestige and M represents the household’s
characteristics such as age, sex, educational attainment, status of the head of the
household and other demographic characteristics.
Throughout the discussion of this model, non-satiation (higher quantities provide
greater level of satisfaction) and one decision maker per household are assumed. The
household has Y level of income (income after taxes), which might consist of non-welfare
earned income and cash welfare income (if any). It is assumed that the household has
information regarding the FSP and they are eligible to participate in the program.
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The utility maximizing problem for FSP eligible household can be represented
as:
MaxU = U ( H , FY + FS , M , R )

s.t

PF FY + PH H ≤ Y '

where

(3.2)
Y '= Y − C

PF FS ≤ A
R = R( FS , M )

(3.3)
(3.4)
(3.5)

H > 0, FY ≥ 0, FS ≥ 0 and FY + FS > 0
where PF is price of food, PH is price of the Hicksian good, Y is income, C is the
transaction cost of participating in FSP, Y is transaction cost adjusted income, and A is
total allotted amount of benefit. H > 0 indicates that non food items will be consumed
whether or not food stamps are used by the household. FY ≥ 0 shows that food items may
or may not be purchased using cash or income. Similarly, FS ≥ 0 indicates that
households may not use food stamps and FY + FS > 0 shows that households consume
food items by spending either their income and/or using food stamps.
The utility maximizing household is constrained by the level of income (equation
3.3) after accounting for the transaction cost of participation. The amount of food stamps
allocated to the household is also constrained by the allotted amount of benefit available
for that household as indicated in equation 3.4. Equation 3.5 shows the prestige or status
of the household determined by the household characteristics, FSP decisions and usage of
food stamps.
The Langrangian equation of the constrained utility maximization problem can be
expressed as:
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− PF FY − PH H ) + λ2 ( A − PF FS ) .
L = U ( H , FY + FS , R, M ) + λ1 (Y '

(3.6)

Since the constraints are expressed in terms of inequality expression, Kuhn–
Tucker conditions are used for setting the first order conditions. The Kuhn-Tucker
conditions to maximize U can be specified as:

∂L ∂U
=
− λ1PF ≤ 0
∂FY ∂FY

FY

∂L
=0
∂FY

∂L ∂U ∂U ∂R
=
+
− λ2 PF ≤ 0
∂FS ∂FS ∂R ∂FS

FS

∂L
=0
∂FS

∂L ∂U
=
− λ1PH ≤ 0
∂H ∂H

H

∂L
=0
∂H

∂L
=Y '
− PF − PH H ≥ 0
∂λ1

λ1

∂L
=0
∂λ1

∂L
= A − PF FS ≥ 0
∂λ2

λ2

∂L
=0
∂λ2

FY ≥ 0, H > 0 and FS ≥ 0

(3.7)

(3.8)

(3.9)

(3.10)

(3.11)

(3.12)

(3.13)

(3.14)

(3.15)

(3.16)
(3.17)
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Based on the first order and Kuhn-Tucker conditions, three cases are considered
to examine the utility maximizing conditions for the participant household.

Case 1: FS = 0 (no food stamp benefits used): In this case, eligible households undertake
the necessary procedure and certification. However, households prefer to purchase food
with cash by allocating some portion of their income instead of food stamps. Since the
utility maximization model considers net income after accounting for transaction cost
associated with FSP participation, the decision of not participating in the FSP implies that
the variable cost of the stigma is higher than the benefit of the stamp for these
households.
From equation 3.15

∂L
= A − PF (0) ≥ 0 ,
∂λ2

Therefore, from equation 3.16

λ2

A>0

∂L
∂L
= 0 , and, λ2 = 0 since
> 0.
∂λ2
∂λ2

In this case, λ2 = 0 , which indicates that a marginal increase in food stamp allotment does
not increase the household’s utility since the household does not use the food stamps to
purchase food.
The behavior of the household can also be expressed graphically in terms of
indifference curves. Figure 3.1 shows the indifference curve of a household that does not
participate in FSP despite benefit is allocated to the household.
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Figure 3.1. Indifference Curve of a Household not Using Food Stamps Despite being Eligible for
Participation.

H

h1
a

h0

U0

f0

F

f1

The household consumes f0 and h0 level of food and Hicksian goods, respectively
before and after participating in the program. The equilibrium point that maximizes
utility is point a in both cases (before and after participating in the program). Even if the
budget line of the household shifts by the amount of the food stamp benefit, the
household retains the same utility level since the household does not use it.

Case 2: 0 < FS <

A
: In this case the household uses the food stamps but does not exhaust
PF

the entire amount. Given this condition, the optimal condition can be characterized as:
A
∂L
thus
> 0.
∂λ2
PF

From equation 3.15

∂L
= A − PF FS ≥ 0
∂λ2

From equation 3.10

∂L
= 0 FS > 0 since some food is bought using food stamps.
∂FS

Therefore, from equation 3.16 λ2

A > 0 since FS <

∂L
∂L
= 0 , and, λ2 = 0 since
> 0.
∂λ2
∂λ2
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∂L ∂U ∂U ∂R
=
+
− λ2 PF = 0 , then, following the above
∂FS ∂FS ∂R ∂FS

Consider equation 3.9

arguments,

∂U
∂U ∂R
=−
.
∂FS
∂R ∂FS

(3.18)

Since the household does not exhaust the entire food stamp allocation, A in
equation (3.15) is not binding, indicating that the household’s food consumption is not
constrained by the amount of food stamp allotment. Equation 3.18 indicates that the
households purchase food with food stamps until the marginal utility of food purchased
with food stamps is equal to the marginal disutility of the stigma associated with using
the food stamps. The marginal increase in total benefit does not increase the utility of the
household since the household does not use the entire food stamp benefit, the additional
benefit from using food stamps might not have an effect on the utility of the household’s
food consumption i.e λ2 = 0 . Figure 3.2 shows the indifference curve of a household that
does not use the entire benefit.
Figure 3.2. Indifference Curve of a Household that Does Not Exhaust the Entire Food Stamp
Benefit

H

c

h1
h0

U1

b
U0

f0

f1

f2

F
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Originally the household allocates its income among Hicksian goods and food
items at equilibrium point of b by consuming f0 and h0 amount of food and Hicksian
goods, respectively. After participating in the program the household only uses part of the
allotted food stamps and spends the entire income on Hicksian goods.

The new

equilibrium point that maximizes utility is point c where the household consumes f1 and
h1 amount of food and Hicksian goods, respectively.

Case 3.: FS =

A
In this case the household exhausts the benefit of food stamps. Two
PF

different scenarios are considered in this situation. Where λ2 = 0 , which indicates that the
household exhausts the entire food stamp benefit and even if the food stamp allotment
increases the household does not use it, and λ2 > 0 indicates that the household uses the
entire benefit and if additional food stamp is allocated, the household will use it.
For the case where λ2 = 0 , FY > 0 and FY = 0 , the household fully utilizes the
allotted benefit and additional food may or may not be purchased using cash. Under this
scenario, equilibrium occurs (for both FY > 0 and FY = 0 ) at the point where the marginal
utility of food purchase with food stamps equals to the marginal disutility of food stamps:
∂U
∂U ∂R
=−
.
∂FS
∂R ∂FS

For the case λ2 > 0 , FY > 0 and FY = 0 , the marginal increase in benefit increases the
household utility. Again the household may or may not purchase food with cash.
From equation 3.10, since FS

∂L
= 0 and FS > 0
∂FS

thus,

∂L
= 0.
∂FS
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∂U ∂U ∂R
∂U ∂U ∂R
+
= λ2 PF , and
+
> 0 since λ2 > 0 and
∂FS ∂R ∂FS
∂FS ∂R ∂FS

From equation 3.9,
PF > 0 .

Therefore, after rearranging the above equation

∂U
∂U ∂R
>−
.
∂FS
∂R ∂FS

(3.19)

Equation 3.19 implies that at equilibrium, the marginal utility from food stamps is greater
than the marginal disutility associated with participation.
If FY = 0 and FS =

A
, from equation (3.14) Y '= PH H which indicates that the
PF

entire income is allocated for non food items of other goods and services. This behavior
of the household under this scenario is presented graphically in terms of indifference
curves in figure 3.3.
Figure 3.3 Indifference Curve of a Household that Exhausts the Food Stamp Benefit but Does Not
Spend Income to Purchase Additional Food

H

d

h1
h0

c

f0

U
U1

U0

f1

F

Before participating in FSP program, the household used to consume f0 level of
food and h0 level of Hicksian goods. Consumption of food and Hicksian goods increases
after participating in the FSP. The household now consumes f1 and h1 level of food and
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Hicksian goods, respectively. The new utility maximizing level of consumption is
achieved at point d.
If FY > 0 and FS =

A
which indicates that the household allocates income to food and
PF

Hicksian goods.
From equations 3.7 and 3.8,

If H > 0 and FS =

∂U
= λ1PF .
∂FY

(3.20)

A
, then
PF

from equations 3.11 and 3.12,

∂U
= λ1 PH
∂H

and, from equations 3.20 and 3.21

∂U / ∂FY PF
=
.
∂U / ∂H PH

(3.21)

(3.22)

Equation 3.22 indicates that at equilibrium point the marginal rate of substitution
between food and other goods and services is equal to their price ratio. Given household
participation, the Marshallian demand for food out of income is represented
, A, M ) . Therefore, for eligible households, food demand out of cash
as: FY = F ( PF , PH , Y '

is determined by the price of food, the price of other goods and services, income (after
accounting to the transaction cost), amount of food stamp benefit, and characteristics of
the household.
Figure 3.4 depicts the indifference curve of a household that allocates income for
both food and Hicksian good purchases.
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Figure 3.4. Indifference Curve of a Household that Allocates Income to Purchase
Additional Food
H
m
f

h1
e

h0

U1
U0

n

F
Before participating in FSP, the household maximizes utility by consuming f0 and
f0

f1

h0 level of food and Hicksian goods, respectively at equilibrium point of e. Now the
household consumes the combination of food and Hicksian goods by allocating income
for the two goods and participating in FSP. The amount of income allocated for both
goods depends on the household’s preference of what to consume more. If the household
prefers to consume more of food, it will allocate a higher proportion of income to food
and the equilibrium point where utility is maximized would be closer to n. Similarly, if
the household prefers to spend less on food and more on Hicksian goods, the utility
maximizing equilibrium point will be close to point m. It is also possible that the
household allocates income equally to both food and Hicksian goods.
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CHAPTER 4
EMPIRICAL MODELING OF FOOD STAMP PARTICIPATION
4.1 MODEL SPECIFICATION
Participation in FSP is an individual’s or household’s voluntary decision to receive
monthly benefit by fulfilling all the eligibility requirements. The theoretical model
developed in chapter three explained that participation decisions by households depends
on the household economic situation, such as income, the price of goods and services,
stigma, food stamp benefit level, and composition of the household.
Similar to other economic decision making, household participation in FSP
involves a set of benefit and cost considerations. Chapter three discussed the
microeconomic foundation behind FSP participation decisions. Households are interested
in maximizing their utility from the consumption of goods and services and from
participation in FSP that generates a flow of benefits.
Income, household composition, household employment, the cost of food and
other goods and services, and other household characteristics are important parameters
that affect FSP participation decisions of a household. Although the combination of
declining income and change in household structure generally lead to FSP participation,
income change triggers most movement into and out of the FSP (Gleason et al., 1998).
Household characteristics in terms of poverty level, employment status, family structure,
for example number of dependants, are also important in determining criteria that can
affect the economic decision of participation in FSP.
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Direct observation of these household socio-economic parameters that influence
FSP participation decisions requires detailed survey data. This approach provides an
understanding of the relationship between household economic conditions and FSP
participation decisions using micro-level household modeling method, like logit and
probit models. The interest of the present study is rather to abstract from household-level
FSP decision modeling to a more general county level macro modeling of FSP decisions
that may have relevant bearing on welfare program policies. However, such transition
from micro-level modeling to macro-level modeling first requires establishing proper
links between micro-level economic parameters and ways to observe them using
generalized data.
Household income is an important variable in understanding FSP participation
patterns. To account for this household economic variable, county per capita income is
used to measure the county level relationship between income and FSP participation.
This study assumes that county level per capita income trends reflect the county’s level
household income.
Another economic factor that might determine household’s FSP participation
decisions is household employment status. This study uses county level of employment
and unemployment growth rate variables as proxies for household employment and
unemployment status, respectively. The effectiveness of county level employment and
unemployment growth rate as a proxy for household employment depends on how cycles
in county employment and unemployment reflect similar patterns at the household level.
Aside from income and employment, the household FSP participation decision is
affected by the degree of household poverty. As a direct extrapolation, the county level
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measure of poverty is used as a proxy variable for household poverty levels. It is
measured as the percentage of persons in a county that are in poverty.
As a direct proxy for household FSP participation, the percentage of people who
participate in the FSP out of the total population in that county is introduced. As a proxy
variable, it is more likely that the county level percentage of FSP participation captures
household level participation decisions.
To empirically analyze the impact of economic and policy factors on FSP
participation, two econometric models are used: static and dynamic models. In the static
model, the explanatory variables for period, say, t= j (j=1,…,n) are assumed to affect
participation in the same period, t=j. In the dynamic model, the dependent variable (FSP)
depends on lagged participation in period t-j (where j represent the number of lags, and
j=1,…n), lagged macroeconomic variables as well as current macroeconomic and policy
variables are used. The rationale for using the dynamic model is that an event in one
period may affect program participation for several subsequent periods due to lags in the
adjustment of economic variables.

Both static and dynamic econometric models of the study are developed following
the models and approaches employed by Wallace and Blank (1999), Figlio et al., (2000)
and Ziliak et al., (2003). These studies developed both static and dynamic models to
examine the impact of economic variables, policy, and political variables on food stamp
caseloads using nationwide state panel data. In their empirical estimation, they
considered food stamp caseload as the dependent variable and many independent
variables such as employment growth rate, unemployment rate, welfare reform indicator,
EBT (Electronic Benefits Transfer) indicator, a vector that indicated the political
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environment of each state, able-bodied adult without dependent (ABAWD) wavier, and
other variables.
In this empirical study, static and dynamic models are developed to test the
relationship between FSP participation and county level economic and policy variables in
West Virginia. The empirical models and data collection are discussed in the following
sections.

4.1.1 Static Model
In the static model, given a general model Yit = β it X it + ε i , the effect of the independent
variables X at year t on the dependent variable Y at the same period is examined. The
presumption of the static model is that prior events that occurred in lagged periods do not
significantly affect the present event, or mathematically cor(Yt, Xt-1) = 0, where cor refers
to correlation, Yt is the dependent variable at time t, and Xt-1 is all the lagged explanatory
variable arguments that can be introduced in the model. A zero correlation in this case
means that the dependent variable Y is independent of the influence of lagged explanatory
variables.
A number of explanatory variables are introduced for empirical estimation. For
empirical estimation, panel data (time series and cross-section) is introduced for all
variables. The macroeconomic variables included are county level unemployment rate,
employment growth rate, per capita personal income, percentage of county population
under poverty, and consumer price index. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act of 1996 (PROWRA) is also included to capture the policy variable.
However, even if EBT is another policy variable it is excluded from the model as this
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policy is introduced in 2002 in West Virginia and no sufficient time is covered by this
policy for estimation of its impact on FSP participation.

The static empirical econometric model can be specified as:
FSPit = f (UEMPRit , EMPGit , PCPI it , POVit , CPI it , PRWORAit , GOVit , t )

(4.1)

Where FSPit = percentage of population participating in food stamp program
in county i in year t
UEMPRit = unemployment rate in county i in year t
EMPGit = employment growth rate in county i in year t
PCPI it = per capita personal income
POVit = percentage of people living in poverty in county i in year t.

CPit = consumer price index at time t
PRWORAt = Personal Responsibility And Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act
of 1996
GOVt = political affiliation of governor in office at time t
t = trend variable

i and t = represents counties and year (time), respectively
The functional relationship in equation (4.1) hypothesizes that food stamp
caseloads are a function of employment and income opportunities, welfare reform,
proportion of the county population living in poverty, general price level, and a time
trend variable.
From equation (1), a static model can be specified as:
FSPit = β0 + β1UEMPRit + β2EMPGit + β3PCPIit + β4POVit + β5CPIt + β6PRWORAt + β7GOVt + β8t + ui (4.2)

51

This model is estimated using least-squares-dummy-variable method, which is
discussed further in chapter 5.

4.1.2 Dynamic Model
Though the static model is important in examining the relationship between socioeconomic variables and FSP participation, the argument that past socio-economic
conditions may not affect current FSP levels makes the model restrictive.
Last period economic performance may affect the current FSP participation
decision and eligibility. For example, lagged unemployment and employment rates may
affect the current FSP participation decision and eligibility. Since most of the food stamp
recipients are characterized as low skilled and less educated, therefore, they are less
likely to be employed instantaneously as the economy booms (McKernan, 2003).
Unemployed people may not also be eligible in the program instantaneously, rather after
adjusting down or lowering their initial asset level to the eligibility requirement so that
they become eligible in the program (Figlio et al., 2000; Ziliak et al., 2002). Hanson and
Gundersen (2002) also explained the effect of lagged unemployment on current FSP
participation. For some people who lose their jobs during economic downturn,
unemployment insurance benefits offset a portion of the lost earning. As a result, many
households or individuals remain ineligible for the program. However, the FSP is
particularly important for many workers not covered by unemployment insurance,
particularly those in low wage jobs. Conversely, during economic expansion, the FSP
participation does not respond instantaneously as new employed persons may not quickly
exit FSP until program participation is renewed (Ziliak et al., 2003).
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Unlike static model, the use of dynamic model makes it possible to see the effect
of economic changes beyond the current period. The dynamic model assumes that food
assistance recipients of this year are more likely to be food stamp recipients next year
than those not receiving food stamp this year (Hanson and Gundersen, 2002; Figlio et al.,
2000). Lagged FSP is used as control variable for the implication of previous year
participation decision on current decision.
A dynamic model also captures the delay of non-recipients to enroll in the
program after becoming unemployed. A dynamic model allows the sluggish adjustment
of food stamp participation to lagged food stamp participation, unemployment rate,
employment rate, per capita income, and cost of living. Hence, the assumption that past
socio-economic patterns may not affect current period FSP is relaxed. In a dynamic
model, cor(FSPt, Xt-1)

0. The impact of past socio-economic variables may be equal or

different from zero. The statistical significance of these variables being equal to zero or
different from zero can be tested after estimation of the dynamic model.
The dynamic model of FSP participation is specified as follows:
FSPit = f ( FSPit − j , UEMPRit − j , EMPGit − j , PCPI it − j , POVit − j , CPI t − j , R )

(4.3)

where R = f (UEMPRit , EMPGit , PCPI it , POVit , CPI t , PRWORAt , GOVt , t ) and

j = 1, 2, 3...6
Since the data covers seven years, the maximum lag that can be introduced is six lag
period.
Following equation (4.3), the dynamic estimation model can be specified as:
FSPit = β0 +

J
j =0

β1 UEMPRit − j +

J
j =0

β 2 EMPGit − j +

J
j =1

β3 FSPit − j +

J
j =0

β4 PCPIit − j +

J
j =0

β5 POVit − j +

J
j =0

β6CPIit − j +

n =13

β ( n =7)

β n Rit

(4.4)
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where
13

β = 7)

β n Rit = β 7UEMPRit + β 8 EMPGit + β 9 PCIPit + β10 POVit + β11CPI it + β12 PRWORAit + β13t + uit

where FSPit − j denotes lag FSP

UEMPRit − j = lag unemployment growth rate
EMPGit − j = lag employment growth rate
PCPI it − j = lag per-capita Income
POVit − j = lag level of Poverty measured in terms of percentage of people who
live in poverty
CPI t − j = lag consumer price index
Thus, this dynamic model integrates the static model variables and develops a
lagged variable argument for FSP, unemployment rate, employment growth rate, and
poverty.

4.2 METHOD OF ESTIMATION
Both static and dynamic models use county level panel data. As such, estimation of the
two models needs to take into account the econometric methods applied to panel data
models. Panel data models provide regression analysis with both spatial and temporal
dimensions. The spatial dimension shows a set of cross-sectional units or observations. In
this case the spatial dimension represents West Virginia counties. The temporal
dimension pertains to periodic observation of a set of variables characterizing the crosssectional units over a particular span of time.
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Panel data can be used to deal with heterogeneity in cross-sectional observations.
In any cross-section, there might be many unmeasured explanatory variables that affect
the behavior of the cross-sections being analyzed. Cross-sectional heterogeneity may
indicate that there could be many unmeasured variables that influence the dependent
variable. This phenomenon suggests that pooled OLS is a biased estimator unless the
influence of this omitted variation (embodied in different intercepts) is uncorrelated with
the included explanatory variables (Wooldridge, 2006).
There are two types of estimation approaches for panel data models: pooled
regression method and fixed effects estimation method. The pooled regression method is
based on the assumption that all coefficients of the explanatory variables and the
intercept considered in the model are constant for all counties across time. This method
of estimation assumes homogeneity, i.e., all counties are not different from one another in
fundamental unmeasured ways. This restricted assumption might distort the true picture
of the result since all counties might not possess similar characteristics that do not change
over time (time-invariant). The specifications of pool regression method for static and
dynamic model are the same as the specification shown in equations 4.2 and 4.4,
respectively.
However, in reality counties may possess different time-invariant characteristics.
For example, demographic composition such as race, gender, religion, etc are timeinvariant variables that do not change over time and the distribution might not be the
same in each county. As indicated in chapter 2, FSP participation is different among
different demographic groups based on marital status of the household, age, and race.
Historical data suggested that FSP participation is higher among single parents and
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children but participation is lower among seniors. Similarly, FSP participation is also
different among racial groups.
Counties may have different demographic composition. For example, the
proportion of single-parent households living in one county might differ from the other
county. The same might hold true for other demographic characteristics such as race and
age. Differences in demographic composition among counties might lead to differences
in FSP. Therefore, in addition to the economic and policy factors, county specific timeinvariant factors might affect FSP. Based on this discussion, county homogeneity
assumption of pooled regression method might not be valid.
The fixed effects method of estimation relaxes the county homogeneity
assumption by accounting for county differences. The fixed effects estimation method for
static and dynamic models is specified in equation (4.5) and equation (4.6), respectively.

FSPit = β0 +β1UEMPRit +β2EMPGit +β3PCPIit +β4POVit +β5CPIit +β6PRWORAit +β7EBTit +β8GOVt +β9t +ai +ui (4.5)

FSPit = β0 +

J
j =0

where

β1 UEMPRit − j +
n=13

β (n=7)

J
j =0

β 2 EMPGit − j +

J
j =1

β3 FSPit − j +

J
j =0

β 4 PCPI it − j +

J
j =0

β5 POVit − j +

J
j =0

β 6CPI it − j

n =13

β ( n = 7)

β n Rit

βnRit = β7UEMPRit + β8EMPGit + β9PCIPit + β10POVit + β11CPIit + β12PRWORAit + β13t + a i +uit

The fixed effects method of estimation introduces the variable ai for both static
and dynamic models. This variable captures all unobserved time-invariant variables that
may affect the dependent variable.
Estimation of the variable ai necessitates the introduction of dummy variables for
all cross-section observations in the model. Dummy variable of each cross section
56

(4.6)

captures the effect of county’s time-invariant variables on food stamp participation. The
inclusion of dummy variables will eliminate ai and the impact of time-invariant variables
reflected on intercept and introduced dummy variables. The approach this study follows
to introduce dummy variables in the model is discussed in chapter 5.
Some variables such as EBT, demographic characteristics (such as proportion of
single headed households, elderly, disabled) are important variables that might affect
food stamp participation decision beside economic and policy variables. The introduction
of EBT in the model would expect to control the stigma cost associated with FSP
participation. However, the data that this study relies on is limited before EBT became
functional in all West Virginia counties, therefore, the model does not control for the
effect of EBT on FSP participation. Similarly, due to unavailability of data, demographic
characteristics are not included in the model. However, the impact of these variables is
accounted by the variable ai .

4.3 TYPES AND SOURCES OF DATA
The study of FSP participation and the factors that determine the individual or the
household participation in the program needs to examine the economic, policy, and
demographic factors and their interaction with FSP. The need for identifying factors that
influence FS participation necessitates extensive data collection and organization.
In this study, the employment growth rate and unemployment rate of each county
is used to examine the impact of economic cycles on FSP. Both employment and
unemployment variables are based on time series data included in the model to capture
the labor market condition of West Virginia counties. Also, to examine the impact of
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poverty level on FSP, data on percentage of county population who live in poverty is
collected.
Policy change is another important variable that is considered in the model. The
policy variable is constructed as a discrete dummy variable that corresponds to the
enactment and implementation of the policy at a given time period. For the time period
prior to the introduction of PROWRA, the dummy variable is assigned a value of 0 and
for the time period from 1997 to 2002, it is assigned a value of 1.
The political variable measures the political climate in West Virginia over the
period under consideration. States cannot propose major policy changes or directly alter
FSP eligibility or payment rules through state legislation or regulation (Wallace and
Blank 1999). However, this study incorporates this variable to test whether people’s
perception of FSP participation differs with political affiliation of governors.
In this study, a dummy variable is introduced to account the political affiliation
of West Virginia’s governors. The values of dummy variable assigned for democrat
governor is 1 and 0 for republican governor. The goal is to test whether food stamp
program participation decision is influenced by governor’s political affiliation.
For the purpose of empirical estimation, the study uses panel data. Panel data is
compose of both cross-section and time series data. The study uses all 55 counties of
West Virginia as a cross-section and considered 7 years of observations (1995, 19972002).
County level time series data for each variable included in the model is collected
from different sources. Table 4.1 presents the variables with their respective data sources.
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Table 4.1.Sources of data.
Types of Data

Sources of Data

Population by county

WVBEP, Census Bureau

Employment and Unemployment by county

WVBEP & BBER

Per capital Personal Income by county

WVBEP

Poverty by county

US Census Bureau

Electronic Benefit Transfer (EBT) by county

WVDDHR

FSP by county

WVDDHR & USDA

Consumer Price Index

WVBEP & BBER

PROWRA (Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act)

WVDDHR

Governor

NGA

Note: WVBEP = West Virginia Bureau of Employment Program
BBER = Bureau of Business and Economic Research
WVDDHR = West Virginia Department of Health & Human Service
USDA = United States Department of Agriculture
NGA = National Governors Association
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CHAPTER 5
EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.1. ESTIMATION PROCEDURES
Determining the appropriate estimation method is very important in finding unbiased
results. Two types of panel analytic methods of estimation: pooled regression method and
fixed effect method are considered. Pooled method of estimation assumes county
homogeneity; however, fixed method of estimation assumes county heterogeneity.
The fixed effect model is estimated using the Least Squares Dummy Variable
(LSDV) method. LSDV method of estimation captures the unmeasured time-invariant
variables that may explain FSP by specifying dummy variables for each county. The
introduction of dummy variables controls for fixed effect variables ai as shown in
equation 7 and 8 of chapter 4. To avoid dummy variable trap (i.e., the situation of perfect
collinearity) in the estimation, n-1 dummy variables, where n represents number of
counties, are introduced.
Aside from the advantage of fixed effect method that recognizes the fact those
counties may have their own specific characteristics or unobserved differences, this
estimation method has its own drawbacks when large numbers of cross-sectional
observations are introduced in the model. A large number of cross-sectional observations
require large number of dummy variables to represent each cross-sectional observation.
Introducing many dummy variables into the model reduces the degrees of freedom for
statistical testing. In addition, the introduction of too many dummy variables in the model
might create multi-collinearity problem which makes difficult for precise estimation of
one or more parameters (Gujarati, 2003).
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All fifty five West Virginia counties are considered in this study. In order to
avoid significant decline in the degree of freedom estimation, counties are geographically
categorized into five regions; eastern, western, northern, southern and central. Eastern
region comprises of eleven counties (Berkeley, Grant, Hampshire, Hardy, Jefferson,
Mineral, Morgan, Pendleton, Pocahontas, Tucker, Randolph), Western region constitutes
ten counties (Cabell, Jackson, Kanawha, Lincoln, Mason, Putnam, Roane, Wayne, Wirt,
Wood), Northern region comprises fifteen counties (Barbour, Brooke, Doddridge,
Hancock, Harrison, Marion, Marshall, Monongalia, Ohio, Pleasants, Preston, Ritchie,
Tyler, Taylor, and Wetzel), Southern region constitutes eleven counties (Mingo,
McDowell, Mercer, Wyoming, Logan, Boone, Fayette, Raleigh, Summers, Monroe, and
Greenbrier), and Central region comprises eight counties (Braxton, Calhoun, Clay,
Gilmer, Lewis, Nicholas, Upshur, Webster)
Using Ordinary Least Square method, both pooled (restricted approach) and fixed
effect (unrestricted approach) static and dynamic models are estimated. To determine
which model, restricted or unrestricted, fits the panel data better, a restricted F test is
employed. Using this test, it is found that the fixed effect model with regional dummies is
statistically significant for both static and dynamic models as indicated in Appendix A-1
and A-2, respectively.
Pooled data provide more information, efficiency, degrees of freedom, and more
variability compared to the uncombined cross-section and time series observation
(Gujarati, 2003). However, since the pooled data involve both the cross-section and time
dimensions, statistical problems such as heteroscedasticity due to cross-section
observations and autocorrelation due to time series observations are more likely to exist.

61

There are many ways of detecting the presence of heteroscedasticity in the
empirical results. Very often, the nature of the observations suggests whether or not
heteroscedasticity is likely to encounter. In cross-sectional data involving heterogeneous
units, heteroscedasticity is a rule rather than an exception (Gujarati, 2003). White’s
General Heteroscedasticity Test is used to detect the presence of heteroscedasticity for
both estimations. The result significantly indicated the presence of heteroscedasticity
(See Appendix C).
There are numerous ways of correcting for heteroscedasticity problem. For the
purpose of this research, the heteroscedasticity-corrected standard error method is used.
This technique will correct the standard error without altering the estimated coefficients.
Since the problem of heteroscedasticity is decreasing the efficiency of the estimation
model without creating bias on the estimated coefficients, correcting for heterosedasticity
will provide more accurate standard error; therefore improve standard error estimation of
coefficients. All empirical results reported in Tables C-1 and C-2 are reported after
correcting for heterosedasticity.
Another statistical problem that commonly exists in pooled data is
autocorrelation. The nature of the observations may suggest the presence of
autocorrelation. One of the methods of detecting the presence of autocorrelation is using
the Durbin Watson (dw) statistic reported along with other econometric software outputs.
The dw for static model estimation suggests that there is autocorrelation problem.
However, dw is not a good indicator of the presence of autocorrelation when the model
includes lagged explanatory variables (see Table D-1). Breusch-Godfrey test is applied to
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detect the presence of autocorrelation in the dynamic model. The empirical results
indicated that there is serial correlation problem as showed in Table D-2.
One problem with autocorrelation is that it increases the standard error of the
estimates and as a result the estimates will be inefficient, even though estimated
coefficients remain unbiased. Correcting autocorrelation improves efficiency of the
estimation.
The presence of multi-collinearity is also examined using Pair Wise Correlation
Matrix. Pair Wise estimation for static and dynamic model is reported in Appendix B.
Estimates in the presence of multi-collinearity remain unbiased, however, the variance
and the standard errors increase, as a result, the probability of obtaining the estimated
coefficient significantly different from the true estimate is high (Gujarati, 2003). One of
the recommended solutions is dropping highly correlated variables or “doing nothing”.
In the static model, the Pair-Wise correlation matrix doesn’t indicate is the
existence of a serious multi-collinearity problem. However, in the dynamic model, when
one period lag is introduced, some variables show high correlation with their lag, but the
signs of the coefficients were as expected. Since lagged variables are important in
controlling sluggish adjustments of the economy, and since most of the signs are
theoretically consistent, no variable is dropped.
However, when two periods lagged variables are included in the model, very
high correlation is evidenced between current and lagged variables and resulted in a poor
fit. Most of the coefficient estimates exhibit unexpected and theoretically inconsistent
results. As a result of the serious multi-collinearity problem, estimation of the dynamic
model is restricted to only one period lags.
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5.2 RESULTS AND ANALYSIS
5.2.1 Static Model Results
The estimated coefficients of the static model are presented in table 5.1. The adjusted Rsquare indicates that 74.6 percent of the variation of the static model is explained by the
explanatory variables specified in the model.
The empirical result indicated that unemployment rate (UEMPR) is positively
related with FSP. The coefficient is significant at 1 percent significance level. A one unit
increase in unemployment growth rate is expected to increase FSP participants by 0.42
percent, holding other explanatory variables constant. FSP participation is responsive to
the change in county’s unemployment rate; therefore, FSP participation level is expected
to increase in counties with high unemployment rate and decrease in counties with low
unemployment rate. This result verifies the hypothesis that an increase in unemployment
rate increases FSP participation levels, and vice versa.
Employment growth rate (EMPGR) has no significant effect on FSP. This result
contradicts with the stated hypothesis that an increase in employment decreases FSP
participation. The result indicates that people might use FS despite the fact that
employment opportunities are expanding. There might be a number of possible
explanations for the result. The expansion of employment in the counties might create
employment opportunities for the working poor and increase their earnings. However,
income growth might be very marginal that they are still qualified to participate in the
FSP.
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Table 5.1. Static Model Empirical Results
Variables
Description of Variables
CTEMP
Change in Total Employment
UEMPG

Unemployment Growth Rate

CPCPI

Change in Per-capita Income

POV

Percentage of Poverty

CPI

Consumer Price Index

PROWRA
GOV

Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act
Political Affiliation of Governor

RD2

Region 2

RD3

Region 3

RD4

Region 4

RD5

Region 5

Trend

Time

Constant

Coefficients
-0.466
(0.299)
0.4200***
(0.138)
-0.2399
(0.356)
0.8289***
(0.784)
0.3152
(0.297)
-0.5177
(1.956)
-0.6039
(0.756)
3.8610***
(0.947)
0.4659
(0.372)
1.1667**
(0.515)
2.3968***
(0.661)
-1.5978
(1.110)
-49.9097

Adjusted R2

0.746

*** and ** denotes level statistical significance at 1 percent and
at 5 percent respectively. Values in the parenthesis denote standard errors.

The type of jobs created in the economy could also determine who would be
employed. The expansion of employment might be concentrated in certain sectors which
might need highly skilled and educated people. The economic expansion might create
very little employment opportunities in some sectors such as construction, retailers and
agriculture where most of the unskilled and uneducated labor might get a job. Therefore,
even if employment opportunities expand, existing FSP participants still continue
participating in the program or new people might enter in the FSP.
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The other possible explanation is with regard to the composition of household
participants. The significant proportion of participants in the FSP might be single-parent
headed household, senior citizens, disabled, or able-bodied individuals with dependent in
which a work requirement is not applicable for their participation and therefore the
expansion of the economy might not significantly affect their participation.
Dependence on the welfare program could also be a possible explanation. In this
case, participants might calculate the benefit of working more hours and increasing
income against losing FS benefit and other welfare benefits as FSP participants could
also be beneficiaries of other welfare programs. Thus, an increase of income due to
working long hours or having multiple jobs not only affects their eligibility in the FSP or
amount of FS benefit, but also affects participation in other welfare programs. Therefore,
if the increase in income is marginal and still make them disqualified for FSP
participation and other welfare programs or lowers their benefit level, participants might
not desire to work after certain income level. However, the above possible explanations
are not supported by the data and statistical evidences.
Change in per-capita personal income (CPCPI) has an insignificant relationship
with FSP. This result is different from the hypothesis that county level income growth
will decrease FSP participation. County per-capita income is used as a proxy for FSP
participants’ income. This result is unexpected, as more FSP participation is expected
with falling incomes. The result shows that income increase does not guarantee life out of
food insecurity. This suggests that increase in income of low income working households
is very minimal that they still need food assistance. The increase in income might not be
proportional for all of the households in the county. The rate of growth of income for
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certain group of people might be higher and the rate would be low or constant for low
income families. In this case, even if county income increases, it doesn’t have significant
impact on participation.
Poverty (POV) has the expected positive effect on FSP. It is statistically
significant at 1 percent level. An increase in county’s population living in poverty by one
percent is expected to increase the FSP participants by 0.82 percent, ceteris paribus. This
direct relationship may indicate that the distribution of poverty across counties affects the
distribution of FS beneficiaries across counties. This result supports the hypothesis that
poverty has a direct relationship with FSP participation.
The cost of living was expected to affect the decision of eligible participants to
increase their participation. The consumer price index (CPI) is used as the proxy for the
cost of living. The result indicates that the effect of CPI on FSP participation decision,
after controlling for the other factors, is statistically insignificant. This indicates that
during the study period in West Virginia, change in cost of living has no significant role
in determining the FSP participation decision of eligible households. This result does not
support the hypothesis that FSP participation and the cost of living are directly related.
Different policy changes may affect FSP participation and the potential effect of
policy changes are likely to vary considerably across different types of households or
individuals. The introduction of Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) is expected to reduce FSP participation at least for two
groups: non-citizens and able-bodied individuals without children between the ages of
18-49. However, PRWORA is found to be statistically insignificant indicating that FSP
participation is not systematically different before and after the introduction of PRWORA
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in West Virginia. Even though demographic variables are not included in the model, the
result might suggest something about the characteristics of food stamp recipients in West
Virginia. FSP participants might be composed of group of individuals or households who
are able-bodied individuals without dependents that fulfill the work requirement but their
income is very low to make them eligible and participate in the program. Moreover, it
might suggest that FSP participants could also be comprised of able-bodied individuals
with dependent, senior citizens or disabled individuals that the policy didn’t influence or
limit their eligibility. Similarly, the proportion of immigrant FSP participants might be
very low that the termination of their benefit does not change the overall participation.
However, these arguments can be supported better with detailed demographic data that
accounts for demographic information. In general, the result does not support the
hypothesis that PRWORA policy helps in reducing FSP participation.
Following similar researches, the political variable (GOV) is included in the
model to control people’s attitude that may have an effect on FSP participation. Based on
the result of previous researches, it is expected that if Democratic governor comes to
office, more people participate in the FSP. However, the finding shows that there is no
statistically significant relationship between FSP and the political affiliation of governors
in office. The result suggests that political affiliation of the governor might not be one of
the factors that affect FSP participation decisions.
RD2, RD3, RD4 and RD5 represent dummy variables of Western region,
Northern region, Southern region and Central region, respectively. The Eastern region
(RD1) is considered as a base region. The percent of the people participating in FSP in
Western (RD2), Southern (RD4), and Central (RD5) regions are significantly higher than
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percentage of FSP participants in the Eastern (RD1) region. FSP participation in Western
and Central region is statistically significant at 1 percent level and southern region at 5
percent level respectively. As compared to Eastern region, FSP participation in Western
region is higher by 3.86 percent, keeping other variables constant. Similarly, FSP
participants in Southern and Central regions are higher than the Eastern region by 1.16
and 2.39 percent, ceteris paribus, respectively. However, the dummy variable that
represents Northern region FSP is not significant, meaning there is no significant FSP
participation difference between Northern and Eastern regions. The fast economic
expansion of the Eastern region (Eastern panhandle) could be one of the factors
contributing to the higher level of FSP participation in the rest of the regions as compared
to the Eastern region.
The coefficient of the trend variable is negative and statistically insignificant. The
trend variable is introduced to isolate increasing or decreasing FSP participation trends
from the data and measure the remaining independent variables’ relationship with the
dependent variable more accurately. The result reveals that there is no systematic trend in
FSP participation in the study period.

5.2.2 Dynamic Model Results
The dynamic model explains variations in FSP by the explanatory variables of lagged
and current change in total employment (LG1CTEMP and CTEM ), lagged and current
unemployment rate (LG1UEMPG and UEMPG), lagged and current change in per-capita
personal income (LG1CPCPI and CPCPI), lagged and current poverty (LG1POV and
POV), lagged and current consumer price index (LG1CPI and CPI), dummy variables for
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Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA),
governors political affiliation (GOV), and the lag change in dependent variable
(LG1CFSP). This specification explains 75.7 percent of the variation in FSP. The
estimated coefficients are given in Table 5.2.
Current unemployment rate (UEMPG) is positively and significantly related with
FSP participation. A one unit increase in the county unemployment rate is expected to
increase FSP participation by 0.35 percent. The result suggests that people instantly
participate in the program in adverse economic situations. This result is robust and
consistent with the result of the static model. Counties with high unemployment rates are
expected to have a high percentage of people participate in the FSP. However, one-period
lagged unemployment rate (LG1UEMP) is statically insignificant. The result suggests
that current employment growth is responsive to FSP participation without taking long
time. Similar to the static model, the hypothesis that unemployment rate has a direct
relationship with FSP participation is statistically supported. However, the relationship
with lagged unemployment rate is not also supported.
Similar to the findings in the static model, employment change (CTEMP) has no
significant effect on FSP participation. Similar explanation as the static model can hold
true in this case too. However, one-period lag change in total employment (LG1CTEMP)
has significant influence on FSP participation. Employment change in current period may
not have immediate effect on the same period of FSP participation. However,
employment growth in the past period would significantly reduce FSP participation in the
current period. The hypothesis that FSP has an inverse relationship with employment
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growth is not supported by the statistical results. However, lagged employment growth
has a significant and indirect relationship with FSP participation.
Table 5.2 Dynamic Model Empirical Results
Variables
CTEMP

Description of Variables
Change in Total Employment

UEMPG

Unemployment Growth Rate

CPCPI

Change in Per-capita Income

POV

Percentage of Poverty

CPI

Consumer Price Index

PRWORA
GOV

Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act
Political Affiliation of Governor

LG1CTEMP

One Period Lag Change in Total Employment

LG1UEMP

One Period Lag Unemployment Growth Rate

LG1CFSP

One Period Lag FSP

LG1CPCI

One period Lag Change in Per-capita Income

LG1POV

One Period Lag of Percentage of Poverty

LG1CPI

One Period Lag Consumer Price Index

RD2

Region 2

RD3

Region 3

RD4

Region 4

RD5

Region 5

Trend

Time

Constant
Adjusted R2

Coefficients
-0.649
(0.235)
0.350***
(0.144)
-0.386
(0.341)
0.177
(0.151)
1.168***
(0.395)
-7.713***
(2.883)
-2.025*
(1.147)
-0.494*
(0.295)
0.510
(0.110)
-0.448
(0.408)
-0.436
(0.372)
0.636***
(0.143)
1.034***
(0.221)
3.607***
(0.915)
0.321
(0.361)
1.042**
(0.508)
2.021***
(0.593)
-9.145***
(2.227)
-183.677
0.757

***, ** and * denotes level statistical significance at 1 5, and 10 percent respectively.
Values in the parenthesis denote standard errors.
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Both current and one-period lagged per-capita personal income (CPCPI and
LG1PCPI) are not significant in determining FSP participation. The same explanation
given in the static model also applies here.
Current FSP participation is negatively and insignificantly related with its oneperiod lagged FSP (LG1CFSP). It was expected that, holding other things constant, last
period FS participants are more likely to participate in current period too. However, the
results indicate that last period FSP participants may not likely participate in current
period. The result suggests about the length of time that FSP participants stay in the
program and the frequency of entrance and exit in the program. However, questions such
as how frequently households participate in FSP and how long they stay in the program
could not be explained by the data set the study relies on.
The result indicates that LG1POV directly and positively influence FSP
participation. It is statistically significant at 1 percent level. As last period’s percentage of
people live in poverty increase by 1, the percentage of people that participate in FSP
increases by 0.64. However, the finding indicated that current level of poverty (POV)
does not have an impact on current FSP participation. This finding is unexpected and
inconsistent with static model result. The dynamic model supports the hypothesis that
there is a direct relationship between poverty and FSP participation, but only if poverty is
a lagged variable.
Unlike the static model the policy variable of PRWORA is found to be
statistically significant and has inverse relationship with FSP participation in this model.
FSP participation is found to be systematically different before and after the introduction
of PRWORA in West Virginia. The introduction of PRWORA affects participation of
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some group of people significantly and leads to the decline of FSP participation.
However, due to unavailability of demographic data which group of people’s
participation is affected more is not known. This result is consistent with the national
trend of the impact of PRWORA policy on FSP participation. Unlike the static model, the
dynamic model supports the hypothesis that PRWORA has an inverse relationship with
FSP participation.
The finding indicates that the relationship between FSP participation and the
coming of Democrat governor in the office is negative and statistically significant at 10
percent. This might be related to the introduction of PRWORA in 1996 and its
implication on the change of eligibility of certain group of people. As discussed in the
chapter 2, the introduction of PRWORA led to an unprecedented decline in FSP
participation nationwide by limiting benefit for some group of people. Similarly the
finding of this study indicated that FSP participation in West Virginia also declined after
the introduction of PRWORA. Based on the previous experience of restrictive eligibility
requirement and prohibition of certain groups that came with the introduction of
PRWORA, people might associate what has happened during the Clinton administration
with the coming of Democrat governor. People, therefore, might perceive that eligibility
criteria would be very restricted and might decide not to participate or exit the FSP.
Dummy variables that represent Western, Southern and Central regions are found
to be statistically significant. This indicates that the percentage of FSP participation in
Western, Southern and Central regions was higher as compared to percentage of FSP
participation in Eastern region (the base of comparison). The percentage of FS
participants in Western region is higher by 3.6, ceteris paribus, than the percentage of
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participants in Eastern region. Similarly, percentages of FS participants in Southern and
Central regions are higher by 1.04 and 2.02, ceteris paribus, respectively as compared to
the Eastern region. The result also shows that the dummy variable that represents
northern region is not significant; indicating that participation rates in northern West
Virginia is not statistically different from the base region. These results reveal the
existence of significant differences in food stamp participation patterns in different
regions of West Virginia. This conclusion is supported by the static model results as well
and the explanation provided in the static model also applied in this model too.
Unlike the static model, the trend variable is statistically significant in the
dynamic model. This indicates that FSP participation has been decreasing through time.
The inclusion of trend variable controls for systematic decrease of FSP participation
throughout the period under consideration.
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CHAPTER 6
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
6.1. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
In this study, the empirical analysis of county FSP patterns is introduced using static and
dynamic econometric models. The results of these models on county socio-economic and
policy explanatory variables are also discussed. The general findings of the study can be
summarized as follows:

•

County poverty levels affect the degree of county dependence on FSP. A rise in
county poverty results in an increase in FSP participation.

•

The distribution of economic opportunities affects county level FSP participation.
A rise in current and lagged county unemployment rate increases the degree of
dependence on food stamp programs. In contrary, lagged employment growth
tends to decrease FS dependence.

•

Both lagged and current county income growth does not seem to deter people
from benefiting from the FSP.

•

The cost of living in general affects participation decision in county welfare
programs. Increase in lagged consumer price index, measuring a rise in the cost of
living, is associated with increasing dependence in county FSP participation.

•

Welfare program policies can have impacts in terms of flow of county welfare
participants. PRWORA (Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act) policy aims at limiting food stamp benefits to certain
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beneficiary groups. Based on the dynamic model result, this policy is associated
with reduced food stamp participants in West Virginia.

•

Political affiliation of governors is another policy factor considered. Based on the
dynamic model result, unlike findings from previous studies, degree of FSP
participation decreased during Democrat governors’ period.

•

There are differences on food stamp program participation levels across different
regions in West Virginia. A region specific participation comparison indicates
that significant regional differences in degree of FSP participation.

Based on the above general results in this study, it is possible to note the
following:

-

It is important to conduct detail study about the demographic characteristics of
people who live in poverty. Understanding the characteristics of the poor such as
their employment status and age, help to design a policy that might have a long
term impact for different groups. Likewise, it is important to understand FSP
participation rate to determine whether the program has been safety net for the
majority of the poor households.

-

It is also important to understand and identify the skill composition and educational
level of low income households and design policies to attract such job where these
people can be absorbed in the job market and ultimately improve their wellbeing.

-

Finally, it is important to reach out to eligible households by conducting outreach
programs to provide information and change the perception of relationship between
eligibility and the county or state political situation.
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Therefore, based on the above results and conclusions, it is recommended that:
First, county level determinants of FSP tend to be long term economic indicators, like
poverty and income growth. As such, policies that aim at addressing welfare programs in
general and FSP in particular, may better address welfare dependence by designing longterm programs that mitigate the long-term economic parameters of poverty, income,
unemployment, and employment growth.
Second, not only is addressing long-term economic problems important to reduce
long-term welfare dependence, but also understanding the distribution of economic
variables is crucial. Though knowing the level of poverty, for instance, is helpful in
tackling welfare dependence, understanding its cross-county distribution may help
prioritize welfare funds and allocation of capital to tackle this problem in a systematic
manner.
Third, the significant regional differences in FSP participation indicate the
existence of difference in regional economic performance. Regional specific economic
initiatives especially for economically stressed areas might be helpful in addressing the
problem.
Fourth, the cost of living and political affiliation of governors could be important
determinants of FSP. However, these are short-term parameters with perhaps limited
impact compared to the deep-rooted long-term economic problems. As such, proper focus
may be necessary in terms of addressing short-term participation triggering factors and
balanced attention on long-term solutions that address the root cause of welfare program
dependence.
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6.2 LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The main limitation of the study is the unavailability of data. Due to the emphasis of the
study on the county level data, detailed economic variable information about FSP
participant is not effectively captured. Moreover, due to lack of time-series demographic
information, the relationship between FSP participation and demographic characteristics
is not properly captured. The following can be suggested as areas further improvement.

Regional

Interdependence:

economic

variables

may

have

significant

interdependence across counties. For instance, income growth in one county may affect
the level of neighboring county. Therefore a spatial econometric model approach might
be important to understand economic interdependence among counties.

Data: Aggregate economic and secondary data might not be a good measure of
economic condition of specific. Thus conducting survey targeting specific groups might
provide more accurate relationship and result. Moreover, expanding the time frame of the
study may help estimate the relationship using advanced method of estimations.
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Appendix A: Restricted R 2 Test
Testing the significance of fixed effect.
Ho: Restricted model is appropriate
H1: Unrestricted model is appropriate

Fcal =

2
2
− R pooled
( RLSDV
) /(k pooled )
2
(1 − RLSDV
) /(nT − k LSDV )

Where T = the number of temporal observation
n = number of counties
k = number of parameters

A. 1 Static Model
Fcal = 6.56 and F = 2.41. Fcal > F .Rejected H0, therefore Fixed effect model is the
valid model.

A. 2 Dynamic Model
Fcal = 3.72 and F = 2.04 . Fcal > F . Reject H0, therefore fixed effect model is the valid
model.

Table A-1 Pooled Regression of Static Model
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ordinary
least squares regression
Weighting variable = none
|
| Dep. var. = FSP
Mean=
15.23257686
, S.D.=
6.762783986
|
| Model size: Observations =
385, Parameters =
9, Deg.Fr.=
376 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 4974.470796
, Std.Dev.=
3.63730 |
| Fit:
R-squared= .716753, Adjusted R-squared =
.71073 |
| Model test: F[ 8,
376] = 118.93,
Prob value =
.00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -1038.8663, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =
-1281.6930 |
|
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=
2.606, Akaike Info. Crt.=
5.443 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =
.42381,
Rho =
.78810 |
| Autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix for lags of 1 periods
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X|
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
Constant
-58.60184505
47.053661
-1.245
.2138
CTEMP
-.4040747627E-03 .23605999E-03
-1.712
.0878
40.883117
UEMPG
.5172536190
.16369875
3.160
.0017
7.8251948
CPCPI
-.2315480963E-03 .37499258E-03
-.617
.5373
732.96623
POV
.8623918446
.85881196E-01
10.042
.0000
18.057403
CPI
.3723575867
.32137994
1.159
.2473
167.37143
PROWRA
-.6273475286
2.0966229
-.299
.7649
.85714286
GOV
-.6989846743
.80427996
-.869
.3854
.42857143
TREND
-1.771059577
1.2085097
-1.465
.1436
4.0000000
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Table A-2 Fixed Effect Regression of Static Model
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ordinary
least squares regression
Weighting variable = none
|
| Dep. var. = FSP
Mean=
15.23257686
, S.D.=
6.762783986
|
| Model size: Observations =
385, Parameters = 13, Deg.Fr.=
372 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 4313.430901
, Std.Dev.=
3.40518 |
| Fit:
R-squared= .754393, Adjusted R-squared =
.74647 |
| Model test: F[ 12,
372] =
95.22,
Prob value =
.00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -1011.4186, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =
-1281.6930 |
|
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=
2.484, Akaike Info. Crt.=
5.322 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =
.44735,
Rho =
.77633 |
| Autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix for lags of 1 periods
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X|
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
Constant
-49.90974775
43.588846
-1.145
.2529
CTEMP
-.4657961069E-03 .29877327E-03
-1.559
.1198
40.883117
UEMPG
.4199881051
.13784838
3.047
.0025
7.8251948
CPCPI
-.2399492915E-03 .35624487E-03
-.674
.5010
732.96623
POV
.8288767324
.78435953E-01
10.568
.0000
18.057403
CPI
.3152641559
.29713907
1.061
.2894
167.37143
PROWRA
-.5176585293
1.9555738
-.265
.7914
.85714286
GOV
-.6038663406
.75641076
-.798
.4252
.42857143
RD2
3.860993631
.94673144
4.078
.0001
.18181818
RD3
.4659155719
.37188407
1.253
.2110
.27272727
RD4
1.166711084
.51464397
2.267
.0240
.20000000
RD5
2.396845601
.66080121
3.627
.0003
.14545455
TREND
-1.597838269
1.1103527
-1.439
.1510
4.0000000
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Table A-3 Pooled Regression of Dynamic Model
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ordinary
least squares regression
Weighting variable = none
|
| Dep. var. = FSP
Mean=
15.23257686
, S.D.=
6.762783986
|
| Model size: Observations =
385, Parameters = 15, Deg.Fr.=
370 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 4618.235745
, Std.Dev.=
3.53295 |
| Fit:
R-squared= .737037, Adjusted R-squared =
.72709 |
| Model test: F[ 14,
370] =
74.07,
Prob value =
.00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -1024.5623, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =
-1281.6930 |
|
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=
2.562, Akaike Info. Crt.=
5.400 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =
.38353,
Rho =
.80824 |
| Autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix for lags of 1 periods
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X|
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
Constant
-275.2033303
87.355725
-3.150
.0018
CTEMP
.1522887490E-03 .24178201E-03
.630
.5292
40.883117
UEMPG
.4252315221
.16908563
2.515
.0123
7.8251948
CPCPI
-.4392837402E-03 .36318767E-03
-1.210
.2272
732.96623
POV
.1851449716
.16500719
1.122
.2626
18.057403
CPI
.9704774918
.40416833
2.401
.0168
167.37143
PROWRA
-5.914751592
3.0115332
-1.964
.0503
.85714286
GOV
-1.094024023
1.2414095
-.881
.3787
.42857143
LG1CTEMP -.5205238440E-03 .23198729E-03
-2.244
.0254
129.29870
LG1UEMP
.7655361369E-01
.12014895
.637
.5244
8.2620779
LG1CFSP -.1105772609E-02 .46559314E-03
-2.375
.0181
-287.22597
LG1CPCPI -.5577853109E-03 .39449036E-03
-1.414
.1582
756.37143
LG1POV
.6459138715
.16966964
3.807
.0002
18.782727
LG1CPI
.8951295027
.25341544
3.532
.0005
162.84286
TREND
-7.792254411
2.3548511
-3.309
.0010
4.0000000
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Table A-4 Fixed Effect Regression of Dynamic Model
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ordinary
least squares regression
Weighting variable = none
|
| Dep. var. = FSP
Mean=
15.23257686
, S.D.=
6.762783986
|
| Model size: Observations =
385, Parameters = 19, Deg.Fr.=
366 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 4066.731727
, Std.Dev.=
3.33336 |
| Fit:
R-squared= .768440, Adjusted R-squared =
.75705 |
| Model test: F[ 18,
366] =
67.48,
Prob value =
.00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -1000.0815, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =
-1281.6930 |
|
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=
2.456, Akaike Info. Crt.=
5.294 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =
.38076,
Rho =
.80962 |
| Autocorrelation consistent covariance matrix for lags of 1 periods
|
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X|
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
Constant
-323.6018891
82.740463
-3.911
.0001
CTEMP
-.6487514339E-05 .23474631E-03
-.028
.9780
40.883117
UEMPG
.3496998122
.14489105
2.414
.0163
7.8251948
CPCPI
-.3865787048E-03 .34113635E-03
-1.133
.2579
732.96623
POV
.1773559642
.15078659
1.176
.2403
18.057403
CPI
1.168199138
.39483217
2.959
.0033
167.37143
PROWRA
-7.713458844
2.8832939
-2.675
.0078
.85714286
GOV
-2.024732277
1.1470406
-1.765
.0784
.42857143
LG1CTEMP -.4942657588E-03 .29475911E-03
-1.677
.0944
129.29870
LG1UEMP
.5104709149E-01
.11039927
.462
.6441
8.2620779
LG1CFSP -.4478105052E-03 .40842398E-03
-1.096
.2736
-287.22597
LG1CPCPI -.4360957297E-03 .37176329E-03
-1.173
.2415
756.37143
LG1POV
.6359747850
.14314275
4.443
.0000
18.782727
LG1CPI
1.033935905
.22126909
4.673
.0000
162.84286
RD2
3.607076017
.91544562
3.940
.0001
.18181818
RD3
.3213958958
.36151165
.889
.3746
.27272727
RD4
1.042889231
.50853726
2.051
.0410
.20000000
RD5
2.020989075
.59297286
3.408
.0007
.14545455
TREND
-9.145479883
2.2269679
-4.107
.0000
4.0000000
(Note: E+nn or E-nn means multiply by 10 to + or -nn power.)
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Appendix B: Testing for Multicollinearity Using Pair-Wise Correlation
Table B-1 Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix of Static Model
UEMPG
CPI
POV
CTEMP
CPCPI

UEMPG
1.00000
-.28898
.62601
-.18238
-.39721

CPI
-.28898
1.00000
-.21989
-.14884
.20099

POV
.62601
-.21989
1.00000
-.10624
-.25284

CTEMP
-.18238
-.14884
-.10624
1.00000
.21371

CPCPI
-.39721
.20099
-.25284
.21371
1.00000

Table B-2 Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix of Dynamic Model Pair-Wise Correlation Matrix
of Dynamic Model
CTEMP
UEMPG
CPCPI
POV
CPI
LG1CTEMP
LG1UEMP
LG1CFSP

CTEMP
1.00000
-.18238
.21371
-.10624
-.14884
.00751
-.06759
.10145

UEMPG
-.18238
1.00000
-.39721
.62601
-.28898
-.27474
.87685
.10208

CPCPI
.21371
-.39721
1.00000
-.25284
.20099
.13412
-.23261
-.21050

POV
-.10624
.62601
-.25284
1.00000
-.21989
-.27396
.64144
.07722

CPI LG1CTEMP
-.14884
.00751
-.28898 -.27474
.20099
.13412
-.21989 -.27396
1.00000
.08085
.08085 1.00000
-.38279 -.29709
-.06344 -.22196

LG1UEMP
-.06759
.87685
-.23261
.64144
-.38279
-.29709
1.00000
.10276

LG1CFSP
.10145
.10208
-.21050
.07722
-.06344
-.22196
.10276
1.00000

LG1CPCPI
LG1POV
LG1CPI

CTEMP
-.03499
-.12006
-.16890

UEMPG
-.28153
.64597
-.26838

CPCPI
.02714
-.29065
.14712

POV
-.24860
.95821
-.20698

CPI LG1CTEMP
.42374
.13828
-.30654 -.25329
.98317
.07337

LG1UEMP
-.43977
.67830
-.39446

LG1CFSP
.06719
.07446
-.07107

LG1CPCPI
LG1POV
LG1CPI

LG1CPCPI
1.00000
-.31103
.46946

LG1POV
-.31103
1.00000
-.31777

LG1CPI
.46946
-.31777
1.00000
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Appendix C: Testing For Using White’s Test
Static Model White Test
Table C-1 Static Model White’s Test

+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ordinary
least squares regression
Weighting variable = none
|
| Dep. var. = ERSTASQR Mean=
11.20371663
, S.D.=
50.29516872
|
| Model size: Observations =
385, Parameters = 21, Deg.Fr.=
364 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 879522.5249
, Std.Dev.=
49.15558 |
| Fit:
R-squared= .094553, Adjusted R-squared =
.04480 |
| Model test: F[ 20,
364] =
1.90,
Prob value =
.01158 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -2035.0654, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =
-2054.1857 |
|
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=
7.843, Akaike Info. Crt.=
10.681 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =
.72934,
Rho =
.63533 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X|
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
Constant
879.1616731
1184.0798
.742
.4583
UEMPG
34.07206533
22.511665
1.514
.1310
7.8251948
CPI
-12.20446239
13.792410
-.885
.3768
167.37143
POV
1.856202768
14.854041
.125
.9006
18.057403
CTEMP
-.9406360421E-02
.17035844
-.055
.9560
40.883117
CPCPI
.2982167705E-01
.14717495
.203
.8395
732.96623
UEMPGSQR
.6196016417
.33097161
1.872
.0620
71.642571
CPISQR
.3873155618E-01 .40654219E-01
.953
.3414
28093.914
POVSQR
.2296361721
.92597015E-01
2.480
.0136
351.98558
CTEMPSQR .1522805724E-05 .27305144E-05
.558
.5774
263903.90
CPCPISQR .1893781697E-05 .72666332E-05
.261
.7945
777416.41
UEMPGCPI
-.1036054988
.12592267
-.823
.4112
1301.3376
UEMPGPOV
-1.275693147
.39959829
-3.192
.0015
151.58434
UEMPCEMP -.3629074360E-02 .38683274E-02
-.938
.3488
18.597403
UEMPCPCI .1523692692E-02 .28309158E-02
.538
.5907
5107.5665
CPIPOV
-.4217040739E-02 .81686557E-01
-.052
.9589
3012.2359
CPICEMP
.2297241400E-03 .96109407E-03
.239
.8112
6157.9039
CPICPCPI -.5859084430E-04 .81792170E-03
-.072
.9429
123562.57
POVCEMP
.2015873971E-03 .23187613E-02
.087
.9308
461.29610
POVCPCPI -.1751908852E-02 .15973814E-02
-1.097
.2735
12604.672
CEMPCPCI -.1319174921E-04 .14638734E-04
-.901
.3681
83598.390

H0: Homoscedasticity
H1: Heteroscedasticity
nR2 = 385*.094553= 36.40
Critical value from chi-square distribution table for 20 degree of freedom (# of
right hand side repressors except the intercept) is 31.41.
Since nR2 value of 36.40 is greater than the critical value of 31.41, the null
hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected indicating the existence of
heteroscedasticity in the model.
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Table C-2 Dynamic Model of White’s Test
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ordinary
least squares regression
Weighting variable = none
|
| Dep. var. = FSP
Mean=
15.23257686
, S.D.=
6.762783986
|
| Model size: Observations =
385, Parameters = 63, Deg.Fr.=
322 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 3633.076378
, Std.Dev.=
3.35899 |
| Fit:
R-squared= .793132, Adjusted R-squared =
.75330 |
| Model test: F[ 62,
322] =
19.91,
Prob value =
.00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L =
-978.3752, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =
-1281.6930 |
|
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=
2.575, Akaike Info. Crt.=
5.410 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =
.84872,
Rho =
.57564 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X|
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
Constant
161.9903666
119.36174
1.357
.1757
CTEMP
.1084257397E-01 .11841483E-01
.916
.3605
40.883117
UEMPG
3.943889514
3.1941557
1.235
.2178
7.8251948
CPCPI
.6394300877E-02 .11827028E-01
.541
.5891
732.96623
POV
1.727412496
6.3320217
.273
.7852
18.057403
CPI
-1.896428348
5.2863184
-.359
.7200
167.37143
LG1CTEMP -.9154436785E-02 .15063759E-01
-.608
.5438
129.29870
LG1UEMP
-3.067845753
3.1303245
-.980
.3278
8.2620779
LG1CFSP -.2200252059E-01 .14681380E-01
-1.499
.1349
-287.22597
LG1CPCPI .2871556256E-01 .15642857E-01
1.836
.0673
756.37143
LG1POV
.5835863301
6.5542390
.089
.9291
18.782727
LG1CPI
-.4079332081
4.7983788
-.085
.9323
162.84286
LGUNEMSQ -.3577690286E-01 .51525683E-01
-.694
.4880
80.299247
LGPOVSQR .5353966209E-01 .37313561E-01
1.435
.1523
382.05303
LGCEMPSQ -.3643354569E-06 .34984182E-06
-1.041
.2985
301494.03
LGCPCISQ -.6773753887E-06 .87879991E-06
-.771
.4414
784268.18
LGCPISQR -.1193618872E-01 .32161146E-01
-.371
.7108
26608.090
LGCFSPSQ -.3090503296E-06 .45830226E-06
-.674
.5006
399991.06
UEMLGEMP -.1894491348E-03 .66251711E-03
-.286
.7751
538.77143
UEMLGPCI .5658341752E-05 .42251959E-03
.013
.9893
5500.3810
UEMLGPOV
-.1047754538
.36872775E-01
-2.842
.0048
158.25225
UEMLGCPI -.1548417509E-01 .19120396E-01
-.810
.4186
1266.0494
UEMLGUEM .6591280232E-01 .57432091E-01
1.148
.2520
74.467429
UEMLGFSP -.1504822163E-02 .44219959E-03
-3.403
.0008
-2062.0319
CPILGEMP .3494141858E-03 .50189014E-03
.696
.4868
22028.561
CPILGPCI -.6530587033E-03 .47515680E-03
-1.374
.1703
128348.58
CPILGPOV -.8854001226E-01 .46432343E-01
-1.907
.0574
3128.7937
CPILGCPI .1906661873E-01 .33482983E-01
.569
.5695
27339.177
CPILGUEM
.1062170768
.62805604E-01
1.691
.0918
1370.9037
CPILGFSP .3401955156E-03 .37981577E-03
.896
.3711
-48394.563
POVLGEMP .5243060641E-03 .78176287E-03
.671
.5029
1590.5351
POVLGPCI .1990088725E-03 .41441178E-03
.480
.6314
13075.157
POVLGPOV -.5378353420E-01 .38435228E-01
-1.399
.1627
365.55455
POVLGCPI -.5128900430E-02 .36664899E-01
-.140
.8888
2930.5067
POVLGUEM .5795110543E-01 .64606291E-01
.897
.3704
160.52088
POVLGFSP .8247116808E-03 .51706889E-03
1.595
.1117
-4965.0475
EMPLGEMP -.2284361401E-06 .82751582E-06
-.276
.7827
7337.9221
EMPLGPCI .1860920110E-06 .85889059E-06
.217
.8286
22669.377
EMPLGPOV -.2566916737E-03 .18666021E-03
-1.375
.1700
435.30649
EMPLGCPI -.5815620302E-04 .70618097E-04
-.824
.4108
5835.6442
EMPLGUEM .5229660485E-03 .32464735E-03
1.611
.1082
217.69351
EMPLGFSP .2380954675E-06 .79375102E-06
.300
.7644
17528.805
PCILGEMP -.2461156692E-05 .14931997E-05
-1.648
.1003
129847.79
PCILGPCI -.1922937823E-06 .11402921E-05
-.169
.8662
560522.30
PCILGPOV .9406127757E-05 .16853355E-03
.056
.9555
12996.580
PCILGCPI -.1646791240E-04 .70629584E-04
-.233
.8158
120043.45
PCILGUEM -.5927926486E-03 .25629465E-03
-2.313
.0214
5660.3182
PCILGFSP -.1160877099E-05 .13648588E-05
-.851
.3957
-268654.70
LGEMLGPC -.2832601354E-05 .14250817E-05
-1.988
.0477
131788.21
LGEMLGPO -.3277416957E-03 .74989096E-03
-.437
.6624
1697.3961
LGEMLGCP -.2648318989E-03 .51322116E-03
-.516
.6062
21427.397
LGEMLGUE -.5305058172E-03 .64606415E-03
-.821
.4122
518.22078
LGEMLGFS -.7141058766E-06 .71709309E-06
-.996
.3201
-103878.88
LGPCLGPO -.3477290929E-03 .44595489E-03
-.780
.4361
13431.719
LGPCLGCP .5268953858E-03 .47446816E-03
1.110
.2676
125224.48
LGPCLGUE -.1039526295E-04 .41436120E-03
-.025
.9800
5546.4023
LGPCLGFS .3460267989E-05 .15393961E-05
2.248
.0253
-199810.37
LGPOLGCP .9142924275E-01 .50164995E-01
1.823
.0693
3042.2987
LGPOLGUE -.1997123788E-01 .68238059E-01
-.293
.7700
167.91473
LGPOLGFS -.3263795037E-03 .53449172E-03
-.611
.5419
-5167.9331
LGCPLGUE -.8996156336E-01 .62914670E-01
-1.430
.1537
1332.4158
LGCPLGFS -.2338567608E-03 .39650955E-03
-.590
.5557
-47153.243
LGUELGFS .2396613707E-03 .46820376E-03
.512
.6091
-2172.2036
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H0: Homoscedasticity
H1: Heteroscedasticity
nR2 = 385*.793132= 305.356
Critical value from chi-square distribution table for 63 degree of freedom (# of right hand
side repressors except the intercept) is ≈ 80.
Since nR2 value of 305.356 is greater than the critical value of ≈ 80, the null hypothesis
of homoskedasticity is rejected indicating the existence of heteroscedasticity in the
model.
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Appendix D: Testing for Autocorrelation
Table D-1 Static Model Fixed Effect Regression
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ordinary
least squares regression
Weighting variable = none
|
| Dep. var. = FSP
Mean=
15.23257686
, S.D.=
6.762783986
|
| Model size: Observations =
385, Parameters = 13, Deg.Fr.=
372 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 4313.430901
, Std.Dev.=
3.40518 |
| Fit:
R-squared= .754393, Adjusted R-squared =
.74647 |
| Model test: F[ 12,
372] =
95.22,
Prob value =
.00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L = -1011.4186, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =
-1281.6930 |
|
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=
2.484, Akaike Info. Crt.=
5.322 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =
.44735,
Rho =
.77633 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X|
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
Constant
-49.90974775
44.733600
-1.116
.2653
CTEMP
-.4657961069E-03 .36101646E-03
-1.290
.1978
40.883117
UEMPG
.4199881051
.77717570E-01
5.404
.0000
7.8251948
CPCPI
-.2399492915E-03 .43705061E-03
-.549
.5833
732.96623
POV
.8288767324
.56914490E-01
14.564
.0000
18.057403
CPI
.3152641559
.30502722
1.034
.3020
167.37143
PROWRA
-.5176585293
2.0104307
-.257
.7969
.85714286
GOV
-.6038663406
.87520897
-.690
.4906
.42857143
RD2
3.860993631
.58377015
6.614
.0000
.18181818
RD3
.4659155719
.52058373
.895
.3714
.27272727
RD4
1.166711084
.67343342
1.732
.0840
.20000000
RD5
2.396845601
.73947639
3.241
.0013
.14545455
TREND
-1.597838269
1.1645505
-1.372
.1709
4.0000000

Durbin Watson method is used to test the presence of autocorrelation of the static
model. The Durbin-Watson statistic from the above regression is 0.44735.
For n (sample size) and k-1 (number of parameters), dL (lower bound) & dU (upper
bound) values can be referred from the Durbin-Watson table.
The sample size is 385. The k-1 # of parameter is 13 – 1 = 12. The D-critical value is
thus: dL (lower bound) = 1.69 & dU (upper bound) = 1.82.
Test the hypothesis:
H0: no positive autocorrelation
Ha: positive autocorrelation exists
Since d=0.443735 is less than dL = 1.69, it can be concluded that there is positive
autocorrelation.

93

Appendix D-2 Testing Autocorrelation using Breusch-Godfrey Test – Dynamic Model
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
| Ordinary
least squares regression
Weighting variable = none
|
| Dep. var. = ERRORSTA Mean=
.1983467018E-01, S.D.=
3.186069224
|
| Model size: Observations =
275, Parameters = 20, Deg.Fr.=
255 |
| Residuals: Sum of squares= 96.30735341
, Std.Dev.=
.61455 |
| Fit:
R-squared= .965374, Adjusted R-squared =
.96279 |
| Model test: F[ 19,
255] = 374.18,
Prob value =
.00000 |
| Diagnostic: Log-L =
-245.9395, Restricted(b=0) Log-L =
-708.3739 |
|
LogAmemiyaPrCrt.=
-.904, Akaike Info. Crt.=
1.934 |
| Autocorrel: Durbin-Watson Statistic =
2.04001,
Rho =
-.02000 |
+-----------------------------------------------------------------------+
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
|Variable | Coefficient | Standard Error |t-ratio |P[|T|>t] | Mean of X|
+---------+--------------+----------------+--------+---------+----------+
Constant
-440.5795871
26.278456 -16.766
.0000
UEMPG
-.4306812088
.30874693E-01 -13.949
.0000
7.3672727
CPI
1.143239563
.10240486
11.164
.0000
171.74000
POV
-.7440296047
.50993918E-01 -14.591
.0000
17.386545
GOV
-4.093108181
.44736027
-9.149
.0000
.40000000
RD2
-.2281483998
.13447041
-1.697
.0910
.18181818
RD3
-.1122191672
.11331196
-.990
.3229
.27272727
RD4
-.5551726368E-01
.15266827
-.364
.7164
.20000000
RD5
-.2408916267
.16009094
-1.505
.1336
.14545455
TREND
-11.22953059
.66144721 -16.977
.0000
5.0000000
CTEMP
.4422413938E-03 .77329310E-04
5.719
.0000
26.290909
CPCPI
.1667972679E-03 .95626873E-04
1.744
.0823
788.57455
LG1UEMP
.3629868457
.31692430E-01
11.453
.0000
7.5345455
LG1POV
.7415885297
.52269769E-01
14.188
.0000
17.565091
LG1CTEMP -.5841081337E-03 .11365677E-03
-5.139
.0000
131.74545
LG1CPCPI -.2864369899E-03 .10569857E-03
-2.710
.0072
860.77455
LG1CFSP -.6698024851E-04 .93164927E-04
-.719
.4728
-369.82909
LG1CPI
1.803369191
.10511302
17.156
.0000
167.86000
ERRLAG1
.7862747209
.35869798E-01
21.920
.0000 -.60217113E-01
ERRLAG2
.1592598884
.34203191E-01
4.656
.0000 -.33111636E-06

Test hypothesis:
Ho: All coefficients are zero
(No autocorrelation)
Ha: All coefficients are not zero
(There is autocorrelation).
Calculated statistics is given by:
(n – p) R2 = (275 – 2) * 0.965374= 263.55
Critical value from Chi-squared table for p=2 degree of freedom at 0.01 (1%)
significance is: 9.21.
Since calculated statistic of 263.55 > critical value of 9.21, it can be concluded that there
is autocorrelation problem.
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Appendix E: Descriptive Statistics
Table E-1 Static Model Descriptive Statistics.
Variable
Mean
Std.Dev.
Minimum
FSP
15.2325769 6.76278399 4.35233000
CTEMP
40.8831169 512.752732 -4860.00000
UEMPG
7.82519481 3.23048049 2.10000000
PCPI
18890.5974 3639.84489 11665.0000
POV
18.0574026 5.09738020 8.60000000
CPI
167.371429 8.99607636 152.400000
PROWRA
.857142857 .350382444 .000000000
GOV
.428571429 .495515604 .000000000
RD2
.181818182 .386196488 .000000000
RD3
.272727273 .445941293 .000000000
RD4
.200000000 .400520495 .000000000
RD5
.145454545 .353017297 .000000000
TREND
4.00000000 2.00260247 1.00000000

Maximum
46.8138000
3030.00000
23.1000000
31923.0000
37.7000000
179.900000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000

Cases
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385

Table E-2 Dynamic Model Descriptive Statistics.
Variable
Mean
Std.Dev.
Minimum
FSP
15.2325769 6.76278399 4.35233000
CTEMP
40.8831169 512.752732 -4860.00000
UEMPG
7.82519481 3.23048049 2.10000000
CPCPI
732.966234 490.716177 -1105.00000
POV
18.0574026 5.09738020 8.60000000
CPI
167.371429 8.99607636 152.400000
LG1CTEMP 129.298701 534.338353 -6550.00000
LG1UEMP
8.26207792 3.47399803 2.10000000
LG1CFSP
-287.225974 564.197751 -4683.00000
LG1CPCPI
756.371429 461.219003 -562.000000
LG1POV
18.7827273 5.41649262 8.60000000
LG1CPI
162.842857 9.51467382 148.200000
PROWRA
.857142857 .350382444 .000000000
GOV
.428571429 .495515604 .000000000
RD2
.181818182 .386196488 .000000000
RD3
.272727273 .445941293 .000000000
RD4
.200000000 .400520495 .000000000
RD5
.145454545 .353017297 .000000000
TREND
4.00000000 2.00260247 1.00000000

Maximum
46.8138000
3030.00000
23.1000000
2580.00000
37.7000000
179.900000
3030.00000
23.1000000
691.000000
2580.00000
37.8000000
177.100000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000
1.00000000

Cases
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
385
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